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ABSTRACT
Does the Maine Constitution afford guarantees for individual rights that are
independent of those afforded by the United States Constitution? As set forth in Part
I, the answer to this question is “yes.” Because state constitutions are a “font of
individual liberties,” the Law Court has adopted the primacy approach to interpreting
the 200-year-old Maine Constitution. Under this approach, state courts must
consider state constitutional claims before reaching any federal claims and must not
give controlling weight to the interpretation given to the United States Constitution.
This approach gives the state constitution the significance that it deserves as a
consequential guarantor of the rights of Maine people, comports with principles of
federalism, and promotes judicial restraint.
Because the Maine Constitution does afford independent protections for
individual rights, a further question arises: Does the scope of the rights protected
under the Declaration of Rights differ meaningfully from those secured in the Bill of
Rights? As discussed in Part II, the text and history of the Maine Constitution
indicates that at least some of the guarantees set forth in the Declaration of Rights
are broader than those set out in the first ten amendments to the United States
Constitution. In particular, the free exercise clause in Article I, Section 3 of the
Maine Constitution is more expansive than its counterpart in the First Amendment,
as it has been interpreted in Employment Division v. Smith. Article I, Section 3
contains specific language ensuring that the state may not burden the free exercise
of religion absent limited, compelling government interests. This text reflects the
founders’ commitment, clearly expressed in the constitutional debates prior to the
adoption of the Maine Constitution, to a generous conception of religious liberty.
As this Article concludes, the Law Court’s primacy approach is sound. Only a
firm commitment to independently interpreting the state constitution will ensure that
the liberties guaranteed therein will be adequately protected.
INTRODUCTION
“Permit me, gentlemen, to hope that the constitution with which God has been
pleased through you to bless us may long preserve the liberties and promote the
happiness of all our fellow citizens, and that for your services you may not only
receive the respect of the virtuous of your own times, but the regard of posterity.”
William King, President, Constitutional Convention of the State of Maine,
1819-18201
In 1819, delegates gathered in a constitutional convention to prepare the
foundational governing document for the nascent State of Maine.2 They might have
1. THE DEBATES AND JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE
(1819-1820), 135 (1894) [hereinafter DEBATES AND JOURNAL].
2. 274 delegates gathered at the constitutional convention. See LOUIS CLINTON HATCH, I MAINE:
A HISTORY 147 (1919); RONALD F. BANKS, MAINE BECOMES A STATE: THE MOVEMENT TO SEPARATE
MAINE FROM MASSACHUSETTS 1785-1820 150 (1970).
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reasonably expected that the courts established under that constitution would closely
consider its text rather than rotely interpret it as a carbon copy of the United States
Constitution. Had the latter approach occurred to the delegates, they might have
dispensed with debating the words used to secure the rights of Maine citizens. But
debate those words they did, over the course of more than two weeks.3 Together, the
delegates produced a remarkable document that would continue to govern the State
over the two centuries that have since passed.
Honoring the work of those delegates, the Maine Law Court4 has chosen to adopt
an independent approach to interpreting the Maine Constitution rather than to
construe the State’s founding document as a carbon copy of its federal counterpart.
The Law Court has expressly endorsed the “primacy approach” to state constitutional
interpretation,5 a doctrine that rests on two fundamental tenets: that state courts
should resolve state constitutional issues before reaching federal constitutional
issues, and that federal court opinions interpreting the United States Constitution are
merely helpful guides when interpreting the state constitution.6 The primacy
approach protects the state constitution’s role as guarantor of the rights of Maine
citizens, comports with judicial federalism, and conforms to principles of judicial
restraint. In short, it ensures that state courts do not “abdicate [their] function of
conclusively resolving matters of purely state law,”7 but instead exercise their
“authority and important responsibility to construe the Maine Constitution.”8 The
primacy approach “has not been consistently followed,” however, and has at times
“been all but ignored.”9 Despite its halting application of the primacy approach, the
Law Court has nevertheless recently reaffirmed its commitment to that doctrine.10
An examination of the free exercise clause in Maine’s Declaration of Rights
demonstrates the necessity of faithfully applying the primacy approach. In Blount v.
Department of Educational and Cultural Services, the Law Court applied a
“substantial burden” test under the Maine free exercise clause: that laws placing a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion are unconstitutional absent a
compelling state interest.11 This test coincided with the then-prevailing approach to
3. The convention began on October 11, 1819, and adjourned on October 29, 1819. See DEBATES
supra note 1, at 44-45, 370.
4. Maine’s highest court, the Supreme Judicial Court, is known as the Law Court when sitting as
the court of final appeal.
5. See State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ (stating that the Court applies the
primacy approach to state constitutional interpretation); State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 34, __ A.3d __
(Connors, J., concurring) (observing that the Law Court has “explicitly adopted” the primacy approach);
State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1984) (noting adoption of primacy approach).
6. See Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __; State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 344 (Me.
1985); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984).
7. Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, L.L.C., 2014 ME 8, ¶ 27, 86 A.3d 52 (alterations
omitted) (quoting Furhman v. Staples Off. Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 27, 58 A.3d 1083).
8. All. for Retired Ams. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 123, ¶ 23, __ A.3d __.
9. Marshall J. Tinkle, State Constitutional Law in Maine: At the Crossroads, 13 VT. L. REV. 61,
62 (1988) [hereinafter Tinkle, At the Crossroads].
10. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __; see All. for Retired Ams., 2020 ME 123, ¶ 23, __
A.3d __.
11. Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1379, 1385 (Me. 1988) (explaining
the test under the federal free exercise clause and equating the protections provided under the Maine free
exercise clause with the protections available under the United States Constitution).
AND JOURNAL,
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federal free exercise claims.12 Just two years later, however, the United States
Supreme Court fundamentally altered its free exercise jurisprudence in Employment
Division v. Smith, concluding that “neutral” laws withstand constitutional scrutiny
regardless of the burden on any religious believer.13 Many state courts changed
course to follow Smith, while others continued to apply the pre-Smith test.14 The
Maine Law Court followed the latter path.15 Had the Law Court ignored the primacy
approach and followed Smith, it would have adopted an approach at odds with a fair
reading of the Declaration of Rights.
Both the text and history of the free exercise clause support Blount. Article I,
Section 3 of the Maine Constitution guarantees that “no person shall be hurt,
molested or restrained in that person’s liberty or estate for worshipping God in the
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that person’s own conscience,
nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments”—a right only constrained
if its exercise would “disturb the public peace” or “obstruct others in their religious
worship.”16 This language does more than create a corollary to Smith’s nondiscrimination principle; indeed, Section 3 contains a separate clause guaranteeing
equal protection.17 Instead, it precludes the state from limiting an individual’s
religious practices, beliefs, or expressions absent compelling state interests.
Moreover, the framers adopted this language after a lengthy debate in which they
expressed their resolve to provide robust protection for free exercise. 18 Section 3 is,
in short, incompatible with Smith.
This Article considers anew the justifications for the Law Court’s primacy
approach and demonstrates that the primacy approach avoids fundamentally
misinterpreting Article I, Section 3 of the Maine Constitution. Part I of this Article
explains the primacy approach and argues that the primacy approach is the most
appropriate method of constitutional interpretation. Part II of this Article shows how
failing to follow the primacy approach would inappropriately curtail the scope of the
right to free exercise under Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights. Specifically, Part
II demonstrates that the right to free exercise of religion protected by Section 3 is
broader than that protected under Smith. In sum, this Article urges a renewed
commitment to a vibrant, independent approach to state constitutional interpretation,
including free exercise jurisprudence.

12. Id.; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406-07 (1963).
13. See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (1990); see also Kennedy v.
Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (mem.) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(noting that Smith “drastically cut back on the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause”).
14. See Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions,
7 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 186-89 (2013).
15. See Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208 (stating
that the Law Court has “expressly acknowledged” that it has not adopted the “holding in Smith” under
Article I, Section 3); MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION 31 (2d ed. 2013)
[hereinafter TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION].
16. ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.
17. Id. (“[A]ll persons . . . shall be equally under the protection of the laws . . . .”).
18. DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 92-115.
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I. THE PRIMACY APPROACH TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
State constitutions, like the United States Constitution, contain meaningful
guarantees protecting individual rights, and state courts do not exist solely to afford
citizens the full protections of the federal constitution. As Justice Brennan wrote,
“[s]tate constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,” 19 the particulars of which
might differ from the federal constitution. Because of this basic fact, the Law Court
has expressly adopted the primacy approach, whereby courts must interpret the
Maine Constitution independently of the United States Constitution. 20 Maine is one
of several states to adopt the primacy approach, which began to gain jurisprudential
traction in the late 1970s and early 1980s in conjunction with a renewed focus in
academia on the importance of state constitutions. 21
The primacy approach is a sound mode of constitutional interpretation. It stands
in contrast to, and rejects, a “parallelism” approach whereby a court construes state
constitutional provisions “as being precisely conterminous with their counterparts”
in the United States Constitution.”22 It also departs from an “interstitial” approach,
“whereby the state constitution is consulted only when the state court is dissatisfied
with the federal doctrine.”23 The primacy approach gives the Maine Constitution the
significance that it deserves as a carefully drafted, consequential guarantor of the
rights and liberties of the people of Maine; reflects its rightful position within our
Republic’s federal structure; and allows state courts to avoid expounding on federal
constitutional issues that they need not reach.

19. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
20. See State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ ; State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 781
(Me. 1984); see also Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 62.
21. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Religion Clauses: Lessons from the New Judicial
Federalism, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 192, 192-93 (2013); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial
Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1097-98 (1997). The seminal article
precipitating the new judicial federalism revolution was written by Justice Brennan in 1977. See Robert
F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. xiii, xv (1996). Maine was not alone in adopting an autonomous approach to interpreting state
charters in the early 1980’s. Among other states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have also
reaffirmed the independent force of their state constitutions. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d
548, 555 (Mass. 1985); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983). It is unsurprising that New
England states have been leaders in this independent approach, given the rich constitutional history of
the region—many of these states’ charters have roots pre-dating the United States Constitution. See
Roderick J. Ireland, How We Do It in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court Has Interpreted Its State Constitution to Address Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U.
L. REV. 406, 407 (2004).
22. Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 74; see also Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and
Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal
Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 983 (1985) (noting that some states “tie their decisions to both the state
and federal constitutions”).
23. Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 95; see also Pollock, supra note 22, at 983-84
(noting that, under the interstitial, or “supplemental,” approach, a court “looks first to the federal
constitution” and generally only reaches the state constitution if “the status of the litigant’s rights are
questionable under the United States Constitution, or if the asserted violation of rights is found valid
under that document”).
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A. The Primacy Approach Explained
The primacy approach has been aptly summarized by Justice Hans Linde, an
early champion of the “new judicial federalism” that revived the primacy approach.24
According to Justice Linde, the proper inquiry under a state constitution is not
whether a particular state guarantee is the same as or broader than its federal
counterpart.25 Rather,
The right question is what the state’s guarantee means and how it applies to the case
at hand. The answer may turn out the same as it would under federal law. The
state’s law may turn out to be more protective than federal law. The state law also
may be less protective. In that case, the court must go on to decide the claim under
federal law, assuming it has been raised.26

In short, analysis of a state constitutional question must proceed on its own, fully
independent of any federal constitutional issues. The point of the primacy approach
is that a state’s constitutional guarantees “were meant to be and remain genuine
guarantees against misuse of the state’s governmental powers, truly independent of
the rising and falling tides of federal case law.” 27
As explained by the Law Court, the primacy approach directs Maine courts to
“forbear from ruling on federal constitutional issues before consulting [the] state
constitution.”28 Thus, when an individual “invokes the protection” of the Maine
Constitution, courts “will . . . examine the state constitutional claim before reaching
any federal question.”29 State courts are charged with the responsibility to determine
the “maximum statement of the substantive content” of a state constitutional
guarantee.30 Only if the state court concludes that the claims under the state
constitution fail should the court take up and consider the claims “from [the]
standpoint of federal constitutional law.” 31 Accordingly, a court should not look to
the federal constitution first and express “restraint” in giving the state constitution a
different construction.32
The primacy approach also directs state courts to use federal court opinions
interpreting the United States Constitution as “helpful guides” to interpreting the
24. Tarr, supra note 21, at 1098 & n.7. The now-old “new judicial federalism” has been the subject
of much analysis, see id. 1097 n.3, which is beyond the scope of this article. This article provides an
overview primarily from a Maine jurisprudential perspective.
25. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165,
179 (1984).
26. Id.
27. Oregon v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983).
28. State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984); see State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17
n.9, __ A.3d __ (“Under the primacy approach applied by this Court, we first look to the Maine
Constitution . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
29. State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 344 (Me. 1985); see State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 34, __ A.3d __
(Connors, J., concurring) (“[W]hen properly raised and developed, we interpret the Maine Constitution
first, examining—independently of the United States Constitution—the constitutional question pursuant
to Maine values.”).
30. State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982).
31. Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1150; see Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 34, __ A.3d __ (Connors, J., concurring);
State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (Me. 1984).
32. Nevertheless, the Court has at times taken exactly this approach. See, e.g., State v. Buzzell, 617
A.2d 1016, 1018 n.4 (Me. 1992).
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Maine Constitution rather than as precedent determinative of the scope of state
constitutional guarantees.33 Of course, the Law Court has “high regard” for the
Supreme Court’s opinions, “particularly when they provide insight into the origin of
provisions common to the state and federal bills of rights rather than only a
contemporary ‘balance’ of pragmatic considerations about which reasonable people
may differ over time and among the several states.” 34 Properly viewed, however,
“federal decisions do not serve to establish the complete statement of controlling
law.”35 Federal case law is merely persuasive, and its persuasiveness depends on the
similarity of the constitutional provisions at issue (both textually and historically) as
well as the soundness of its reasoning. It neither compels a particular conclusion
under the Maine Constitution nor “diminish[es] . . . the independent sufficiency” of
that document.36
B. Justifications for the Primacy Approach
The primacy approach is, as the Law Court has recognized, the best method of
state constitutional interpretation.37 It is the only approach that fully protects the
rights secured by the Maine Constitution. The primacy approach also fits best with
principles of federalism, and promotes well-accepted principles of judicial restraint.

33. Flick, 495 A.2d at 344; see Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ (“[F]ederal precedent
serv[es] as potentially persuasive but not dispositive guidance with respect to constitutional provisions
with similar goals.”).
34. Id. at 344 n.2 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983)).
35. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1122; see All. for Retired Ams. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 123, ¶ 23, __
A.3d __ (stating that the interpretations of other constitutions by other courts does not control the
interpretation of the Maine Constitution); Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 33, __ A.3d __ (Connors, J., concurring)
(observing that federal precedent does not bind state courts when interpreting state constitutions); State
v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶¶ 5, 9, 748 A.2d 976 (noting that the Law Court is “not confined” by Supreme
Court precedent). This accords with the Supreme Court’s own view of the effect of its decisions on
state constitutional law. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (“It is fundamental that
state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.” (quoting Minnesota
v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940))); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283,
293 (1982) (“[A] state court is entirely free to read its own State’s constitution more broadly than this
Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a
different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee.”); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489
(1972) (“[T]he States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.” (citations omitted)).
36. Flick, 495 A.2d at 344. This principle traces its roots further back into Maine jurisprudence
than the genesis of the new judicial federalism revolution. See Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 97, 83 A.2d
556, 561 (1951) (“It is to be remembered that we are now interpreting our own Constitution. In so
doing, we are not bound by any of the interpretations which other courts may have made of their own
Constitutions. Nor do we follow such interpretations except to the extent that the reasoning upon which
they rest is convincing to us when applied to our Constitution.”); see also All. for Retired Ams., 2020
ME 123, ¶ 23, __ A.3d __ (citing Morris).
37. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174 (2018) (“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that
constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words,
must be construed the same way.”); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 381-84 (1983). This article does not exhaustively analyze the various
justifications for the primacy approach, but rather sets forth several themes informing the Maine Law
Court’s primacy approach cases.
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1. The State Constitution as the Primary Guarantor of the Rights of Maine Citizens
The primacy approach ensures that the Maine Constitution retains its intended
position as the primary guarantor of the rights of Maine citizens. As the Law Court
has recognized, the state constitution “has been the primary protector of the
fundamental liberties of Maine people since statehood was achieved” in 1820.38
Indeed, prior to incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights, the Maine Declaration of
Rights provided the sole source of protections for Maine citizens vis-à-vis state law.39
As in other states, the “sovereign people [of Maine] gave limited powers to the State
government,” and adopted provisions meant to “protect[] the people from
governmental excesses and potential abuses.”40 The Maine Constitution was
therefore imbued with tremendous significance at its drafting and ratification, and it
has lost none of that significance. “The Federal Bill of Rights did not supersede
those of the states.”41
In designing the Declaration of Rights, the framers drew from multiple
constitutional sources to adopt broad guarantees of individual liberty. The Maine
Constitution—though based perhaps primarily on the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, written by John Adams—reflects the influence of various constitutions then in
effect, along with the advice of such founding luminaries as James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson.42 The Maine Constitution “contains purposeful differences in
emphases, inclusions, omissions, and phraseology” from both the Massachusetts
Constitution and the United States Constitution—variations that the framers
intentionally adopted.43 In drafting Maine’s unique constitution and “[i]n selecting
the appropriate articulation of a given constitutional right, the framers of the Maine
Constitution tended to favor the most generous formulation available.”44 They thus
chose “to enlarge the number of individual rights expressly guaranteed; to employ
terminology that was expansive rather than constricted, particular rather than
abstract, obligatory rather than hortative; and to emphasize freedom from
government interference as an overarching principle.” 45
The framers, then, did not simply copy any existing constitution, including the
United States Constitution; instead, they sought to—and did—create a unique

38. State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (Me. 1984).
39. See SUTTON, supra note 37, at 179 (noting that state constitutions are the “first bulwarks of
freedom”); Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 68.
40. State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983).
41. Linde, supra note 37, at 381.
42. See Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9 at 63-67, 66 n.27; TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 5-7; BANKS, supra note 2, at 153-54.
43. Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 101. For instance, “the Maine Declaration of Rights
removed the barriers to the free exercise of religion that had been erected in Massachusetts.” Id. at 64.
Maine’s free exercise clause is also significantly more detailed than its federal counterpart. The unique
aspects of Maine’s free exercise clause are discussed further in Part II(B), infra. Other differences can
be seen, for example, in the freedom of speech as well as search and seizure provisions. Id. at 64, 66.
See also BANKS, supra note 2, at 153-55.
44. Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 66.
45. Id. at 67.
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document with independent guarantees for the liberties of the people of Maine. 46
Accordingly, absent a reasoned basis for doing so, it is inappropriate to construe the
document as necessarily coextensive with the federal constitution. Courts have the
duty and “responsibility to make an independent determination of the protections
afforded” under the Maine Constitution.47 If they fail to do so, they fail to uphold
their oath to uphold that constitution.48
2. Judicial Federalism
The primacy approach also accords with the structure of the federal system, and
the place of state constitutions within that system. The United States Constitution
established a system of government based on “a unique concept of federalism and
divided sovereignty between the nation and fifty States.”49 The primacy approach
supports this federal system in two critical ways. First, consistent with the overall
relationship between the states and the federal government, the primacy approach
ensures that state courts retain the authority to interpret state law. Second, the
primacy approach ensures that there are two independent checks on overweening
exercises of state power.
As the Law Court has recognized, construing federal “opinions as expressing a
limitation upon the scope” of state constitutional rights “would be to stand the statefederal relationship and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States on their heads.”50 Our federal system reserves to the states “a substantial
portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty.”51 It is well established that states
“retain ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,’” and are not “relegated to the role
of mere provinces or political corporations.”52 A strict parallelism, which would
ensure that state constitutions are construed in accord with federal precedent, would
undermine this federal structure. Under this approach, the Supreme Court would
have the power to effectively overrule state law precedent and implicitly alter the
scope of state constitutions, thereby subjecting state courts and state constitutions to
shifts in doctrine at the federal level.53 The primacy approach, in contrast, ensures
that state constitutions do not “swing[] on the Supreme Court’s pendulum.” 54

46. BANKS, supra note 2, at 153-54. See generally State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982)
(“[O]ur constitution is not a mere reflection of the federal charter. Historically and textually, it differs . .
. . It is an independent authority.”).
47. State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983); see All. for Retired Ams. v. Sec’y of State, 2020
ME 123, ¶ 23, __ A.3d __ (noting the Law Court’s “responsibility” to construe the Maine Constitution);
Ireland, supra note 21, at 407 (“Because the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is a sovereign
document, the SJC has an obligation to make an independent determination of rights, liberties, and
obligations for Massachusetts.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
48. Ball, 471 A.2d at 350.
49. Id.
50. State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982).
51. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999).
52. Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 39); see Ireland, supra note 21, at 407.
53. See SUTTON, supra note 37, at 183.
54. Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 99. It is not even necessary for there to be shifts in
federal doctrine in order for parallelism to wreak havoc on state constitutional law. Until the Supreme
Court speaks, state courts can merely predict what federal law will be. See Ball, 471 A.2d at 351. As a
result, when state courts assert that federal and state constitutional law are coextensive and then opine
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The primacy approach also protects federalism by recognizing and respecting
the fact that the federal structure was adopted in order to create a “double security .
. . to the rights of the people.”55 The “genius of federalism” is that it ensures that
fundamental rights are protected by not only the United States Constitution, but also
state constitutions.56 This “double security” has real value. While courts interpreting
the Bill of Rights, as incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment, must “give consideration to the nature of federalism,” state courts
interpreting a state constitution are “not confronted with the problems which face
[courts] in determining whether the right was one protected against State
impingement . . . under the [United States] Constitution.”57 That is, while there are
difficult questions regarding the existence and scope of particular rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and whether those rights are incorporated against the
States,58 such questions need not be addressed in order to adjudicate a claimed
violation of a state constitutional right. Accordingly, if state courts conflate their
own state’s charter with the United States Constitution, they vitiate the federalist
structure that was designed to protect the rights of the people59—and potentially
deprive the people of those rights.
3. Judicial Restraint
The primacy approach also promotes principles of judicial restraint. “[I]t is a
fundamental rule of appellate procedure to avoid expressing opinions on
constitutional questions when some other resolution of the issues renders a
constitutional ruling unnecessary.” 60 Likewise, a court should “forbear from ruling
on federal constitutional issues before consulting [the] state constitution.” 61
There are several reasons for exercising such restraint. Reaching federal issues
prior to resolving any state law issues is imprudent, as it creates the significant
possibility of “friction between state and federal judiciaries.” 62 Moreover, reaching
federal issues first is unsound analytically, as there is “no legal basis for addressing
on an area of law that the Supreme Court has not addressed, it leaves state law subject to unexpected
changes. The difficulty this creates is immediately apparent. For instance, in State v. Tozier, the Law
Court first implied that the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 5 are coextensive and then held—
in the absence of Supreme Court case law on point—that a police officer “does not violate the Fourth
Amendment when the officer randomly checks a license plate number of a vehicle on a public road,
learns the owner’s license has been suspended and revoked, and observes no other circumstances that
demonstrate the driver is not the vehicle’s owner.” 2006 ME 105, ¶¶ 6-10, 905 A.2d 836. What if the
Supreme Court were to take up a similar case and decide to the contrary? Would Tozier be good law?
Or would the scope of the state constitutional guarantee change? Such difficulties are avoided if state
courts take care to independently interpret the state constitution. See Ball, 471 A.2d at 351; State v.
Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982).
55. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (quoting The Federalist No. 51); see SUTTON,
supra note 37, at 11.
56. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990); see SUTTON, supra note 37, at 175.
57. Danforth v. Dep’t of Health &Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973).
58. See generally Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1045, 1058-59,
1059 n.48 (1997) (noting complexity of debate over incorporation).
59. Ball, 471 A.2d at 350.
60. State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984).
61. Id.
62. State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982).
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issues of federal constitutional law” if an individual may obtain a remedy under state
law.63 The federal Bill of Rights only applies to the states as a result of incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment.64 But there is no need to consider the federal
constitution when the state constitution provides an adequate remedy. If a State
recognizes and protects a citizen’s rights under state law, then the State has not
deprived that citizen of any Fourteenth Amendment rights.65 Finally, by reaching
and resolving state constitutional issues first, a court provides litigants with a final
disposition of the case by precluding the necessity of federal review. 66 The primacy
approach therefore appropriately directs courts to first determine whether a state
remedy exists before turning, as a last resort, to the United States Constitution.
C. Application of the Primacy Approach by the Maine Law Court
Applying the primacy approach, the Law Court has had no difficulty concluding
in a wide variety of instances—and for a wide variety of reasons—that the guarantees
contained in the Declaration of Rights differ in scope from the Bill of Rights.67 On
some occasions, the Law Court has concluded that textual differences require it to
interpret the Maine Constitution differently than the federal Constitution.68
However, these textual differences have not been the sine qua non for interpreting
the two constitutions differently. 69 In other instances, the court has relied upon
63. Freedom Socialist Party v. Bradbury, 48 P.3d 199, 205 (Or. 2002) (Landau, J., concurring).
64. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982).
65. Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1150; see Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981); Freedom
Socialist Party, 48 P.3d at 205 (Landau, J., concurring); SUTTON, supra note 37, at 180-81 (“When a
state court arrests the relevant state action under its own constitution, any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property or denial of equal protection evaporates.”); Linde, supra note 23, at 383 (“Whenever a person
asserts a particular right, and a state court recognizes and protects that right under state law, then the
state is not depriving the person of whatever federal claim he or she might otherwise assert. There is no
federal question.”).
66. Badger, 450 A.3d at 449; see Ireland, supra note 21, at 407-08 (“The Supreme Court will not
overrule a decision . . . based solely on state law.”).
67. See, e.g., State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ (stating that the right to an
impartial jury under Article I, Section 6 is not necessarily coextensive with the U.S. Constitution);
Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208 (free exercise analysis
under Article I, Section 3 is more rigorous than under the First Amendment); Caouette, 446 A.2d at
1122 (privilege against self-incrimination is broader under Article I, Section 6 than under the Fifth
Amendment); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 170-71 (Me. 1974) (right to a jury trial is more expansive
under Article I, Section 6 than under the Sixth Amendment); Danforth v. State Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973) (due process right to counsel in child custody cases is broader
under Article I, Section 6 than under the Fourteenth Amendment). See also State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55,
¶¶ 4-9, 748 A.2d 977 (declining to “retreat from the more restrictive state standard” in Caouette). Cf.
State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 801-02 (Me. 1983) (noting that the Law Court has expressly “rejected
any straightjacket approach by which [the court] would automatically adopt the federal construction of
the Fourth Amendment ban of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ as the meaning of the nearly
identical provision of the Maine Constitution” and has “acknowledge[d] a duty to declare independently
the meaning of the search-and-seizure clause of the Maine Constitution,” but nevertheless following
persuasive federal precedent in the absence of Maine authority, without independent analysis).
68. See, e.g., Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208; Sklar, 317 A.2d at 166-67.
69. As the Law Court concluded in Flick, the protection provided by a particular provision in the
Maine Constitution “does not depend on the interpretation of the federal Constitution” even if the
relevant texts are materially indistinguishable. State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 343 (Me. 1985) (emphasis
in original). According to the Law Court, such similarities “do[ ] not support the non sequitur that the
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differences in the history of the provisions,70 its prior jurisprudence,71 or its own
judgment regarding the balancing of public policies. 72 The Law Court has thus
utilized a variety of rationales to support its independent interpretation of the Maine
Constitution under the primacy approach.73 When carefully applied, the primacy
approach encourages thoughtful analysis of the text, history, structure, and common
law pertinent to the relevant state constitutional provision. 74
The Law Court, however, has not always hewed to the primacy approach that it
has expressly espoused and has thereby jeopardized the vitality of the rights
guaranteed under the Maine Constitution. 75 At times, the Law Court has appeared
to apply a parallelism approach by stating that a particular provision is “interpreted
coextensively with its federal counterpart.”76 In such cases, it has not independently
examined the Maine Constitution, and has treated federal case law as controlling. 77

United States Supreme Court’s decisions under such a text not only deserve respect but presumptively
fix its correct meaning also in state constitutions.” Id. (quoting State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1322
(Or. 1983)). See Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1150 (applying primacy approach despite lack of meaningful
textual differences between the speedy trial guarantees of Article I, Section 6 and the Sixth
Amendment).
70. See Sklar, 317 A.2d at 167-68.
71. See, e.g., Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶¶ 41, 55, 871 A.2d 1208; Flick, 495 A.2d at 343.
72. See, e.g., Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __; Danforth, 303 A.2d at 801; State v.
Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 626-27 (Me. 1972).
73. Massachusetts’ courts have done likewise. See Ireland, supra note 21, at 409-18 (explaining
how the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has relied on “textual analysis, history, common law,
structural difference, and comparison to other states”).
74. The importance of such careful analysis when interpreting the state constitution should not be
underestimated. Mere “reliance on debates about the meaning of a federal guarantee is not apt to
dignify the state constitutions as independent sources of law.” SUTTON, supra note 37, at 177. Rather
than simply “tak[ing] sides on the federal debates and federal authorities,” state courts should “marshal[]
the distinct state texts and histories and draw[] their own conclusions from them.” Id. As Justice
Ireland of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has observed, a court’s grounding of its
interpretive method in, among other things, “an examination of state history, a careful analysis of the
text, [and] an investigation of the body of statutory and common law on the subject,” will “legitimize[]”
its state constitutional analysis. Ireland, supra note 21, at 406. In short, a court “must be able to explain
its decisions in terms other than the personal preferences of those who make them.” Ireland, supra note
21, at 409 (quoting Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 793, 890-91 (2000)).
75. The inconsistency of the Law Court on this point has been noted by multiple observers. See,
e.g., Jamesa J. Drake, Reviving Maine’s State Constitutional Protection Against Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 68 ME. L. REV 321, 325-28 (2016); Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 94-100.
76. Clifford v. Me. Gen. Med. Cent., 2014 ME 60, ¶ 67 n.21, 91 A.3d 567. See, e.g., State v.
Patterson, 2005 ME 26, ¶ 10, 868 A.2d 188 (discussing Article I, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution);
State v. Anderson, 1999 ME 18, ¶ 9, 724 A.2d 1231 (discussing Article I, Section 6 of the Maine
Constitution); State v. Sterling, 685 A.2d 432, 434 (Me. 1996) (discussing Article I, Section 8 of the
Maine Constitution).
77. The Law Court has even utilized this approach to interpret a particular constitutional provision
despite acknowledging, at other times, that the very same provision may afford “additional protections”
unavailable under its federal counterpart. Compare State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d
1077 (discussing Article I, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution), with Patterson, 2005 ME 26, ¶ 10, 868
A.2d 188 (same). Justice Connors has noted such discrepancies in the Court’s due process
jurisprudence. See State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶¶ 32-33, __ A.3d __ (Connors, J., concurring) (noting
that the Law Court has stated that the state due process clause “provides no greater protection” than the
federal due process clause, but has at other times “departed from federal concepts of due process”).
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In other cases, the Law Court has engaged in more of an interstitial approach,
analyzing federal constitutional claims at length before disposing summarily with
the state constitutional claim.78 These cases are characterized by an initial
examination of the federal constitutional claim and a subsequent determination
regarding whether a different result should apply under state law. The Law Court’s
adherence to the primacy approach has been, therefore, uneven at best. That
inconsistency risks a stunted and improper interpretation of the Maine
Constitution—a topic to which this Article now turns.
II. APPLYING THE PRIMACY APPROACH TO THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE
MAINE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
The Law Court’s primacy approach has led the court to avoid improperly
narrowing the expanse of the protections afforded by the state free exercise guarantee
contained in Article I, Section 3 of the Maine Constitution. As a matter of state
constitutional interpretation, the Law Court has correctly declined to follow the
vagaries of the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, instead recognizing that
Maine’s Declaration of Rights provides greater protection for the free exercise of
religion than that provided under the United States Constitution.
In its Blount decision, the Law Court set out a multi-part test for analyzing free
exercise claims under Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights. As the court noted,
that test coincided with the then-prevailing test under the free exercise clause
contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 79 After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith fundamentally altered the scope of the federal
Free Exercise Clause, however, the Law Court declined to correspondingly narrow
the free exercise guarantees contained in the Declaration of Rights.80
As described herein, the Law Court’s jurisprudence is amply supported by both
the text and history of Section 3. That provision contains broad language ensuring
that the state may not burden the free exercise of religion absent compelling
justifications. This language reflects the framers’ commitment to a generous
conception of religious liberty. Had the Law Court followed Smith, it would have
vitiated the rights guaranteed by Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights.

78. See, e.g., State v. Milliken, 2010 ME 1, ¶ 16, 985 A.2d 1152 (analyzing federal due process
claims, and declaring that the court saw “no reason to depart from the federal standard”); City of
Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Me. 1985) (acknowledging that “judicial restraint impels
us to forbear from ruling on federal constitutional questions when the provisions of our state constitution
may settle the matter,” but nevertheless relying entirely on federal law without analysis of state law or
principles).
79. See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 65-66 & n.3 (Me. 1992); Blount v. Dep’t of Educ.
& Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988). As discussed infra Part II(B)-(C), there was good
reason textually and historically for interpreting Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights to provide
roughly the same protection as available under the then-prevailing interpretation of the federal Free
Exercise Clause.
80. Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208; TINKLE, THE
MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 30.
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A. A Short History of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
1. The Shifting Sand of Federal Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence has
engendered a long and lively debate over “accommodations” of religion.81 The most
significant aspect of this debate has focused on whether the First Amendment
mandates that, in certain circumstances, religious believers must be granted
exemptions (or “accommodations”) from generally applicable laws that substantially
burden those believers’ exercise of their faith.82 In Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin
v. Yoder, the Supreme Court set forth a test that constitutionally required exemptions
to such laws unless the state could establish adequate justification for the
infringement upon a believer’s conscience.83 The Supreme Court’s position on this
point underwent a dramatic shift in 1990 with Smith, signaling an end to such
constitutionally mandated exemptions.84 Smith generated an extended period of
critical analysis and, as—or perhaps more—importantly, a re-invigoration of state
free exercise jurisprudence.
a. Sherbert and Yoder
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding constitutionally mandated
accommodations of religion reached its high-water mark with the “compelling
interest” test in Sherbert and Yoder.85 Simply stated, this test asks two questions:
(1) does the law substantially burden the free exercise of religion? (2) if so, is that
burden outweighed by a compelling state interest that the law is narrowly tailored to
serve?86 If the answer to the first question is “yes,” and the answer to the second
“no,” then accommodation is required. As Professor Witte observed, this test
“served to draw together the classic principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise,
equality, pluralism, and separationism, and to accord free exercise protection to both

81. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV 685, 686 (1992).
82. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1414–15 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, The Origins]. There is also
a second aspect to the debate: whether legislative accommodations are a constitutionally permissible
means of protecting religious freedom. Id. at 1415. In his seminal study of the history of the federal
Free Exercise Clause, Professor Michael McConnell, a former judge on the United States Court of
Appeals of the Tenth Circuit, concluded that “[t]here is no substantial evidence that [religious]
exemptions were considered constitutionally questionable.” Id. at 1511. This Article focuses on whether
or not Maine’s free exercise clause mandates certain accommodations of religion, not on the
constitutionality of legislative accommodations of religion.
83. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-29 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 40208 (1963).
84. See Richard W. Garnett & Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Accommodation Seriously: Religious
Freedom and the O Centro Case, 2005–06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257, 260-66 (2006) (discussing the
Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith cases).
85. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 414–18 (1996) (discussing Sherbert, Yoder
and other Supreme Court cases applying the compelling interest test).
86. See Yoder, 405 U.S. at 214-15.
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religious individuals and religious groups” 87 through accommodations of religion.
In doing so, this test “served to mold the free exercise clause into a . . . delicate and
flexible instrument that could counter both overt and covert forms of religious
discrimination.”88
In Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court affirmed that religious believers were
entitled to accommodations of their religion. In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held
that it was unconstitutional to deny a Seventh Day Adventist unemployment
compensation benefits because of her refusal to work on Saturday for religious
reasons.89 The Court concluded that “condition[ing] the availability of benefits upon
[an individual’s] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”90 It also found
that the law was not justified by any compelling state interest.91 In Yoder, the
Supreme Court held that the Amish should be exempted from compulsory schoolattendance laws because those laws violated their sincere religious beliefs. 92 The
Court concluded that Wisconsin’s “requirement of compulsory formal education . . .
would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious
beliefs.”93 It went on to conclude that the law did not serve a compelling state
interest, in the context of the facts before it.94
b. Smith
A sea-change in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence occurred in 1990. That
year, in Smith, the Supreme Court decided a case involving a challenge by Alfred
Smith, a member of the Native American Church, to the denial of unemployment
compensation based on his sacramental use of peyote, a controlled substance.95 The
Supreme Court rejected Smith’s argument that he had been deprived of his free
exercise rights and, in so doing, did away with constitutionally mandated
accommodations.96 According to Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, “the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” 97 The Supreme
Court distinguished Yoder as a “hybrid” rights case that succeeded only because the
free exercise claim was buttressed by other constitutional claims. 98 The Court
distinguished Sherbert as “stand[ing] for the proposition that where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to

87. Witte, supra note 85, at 414.
88. Id.
89. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-402 (1963).
90. Id. at 406.
91. See id. at 406–07.
92. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-13 (1972).
93. See id. at 219.
94. See id. at 221-29.
95. Emp. Div., Dep’t. of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-76 (1990).
96. Id. at 879-82.
97. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
98. Id. at 881-82.
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cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” 99 Under the new Smith
standard, the salient question is whether a law is truly neutral and generally
applicable.100 Neutral laws of general applicability “must prevail—regardless of the
nature of the state’s interest and regardless of any intrusion on the interest of a
religious believer or body.”101
c. The Response to Smith
The response to Smith among legal commentators has been aptly described as
“thunderous.”102 Some defend Smith, even though its defenders often questioned its
rationale.103 Most scholars, however, criticize Smith.104 These scholars contest
Justice Scalia’s textual and historical analysis, as well as the use of precedent in
Smith.105 Scholars also criticize Smith as leaving religious individuals and groups
exposed to the “crushing” weight of generally applicable laws that “ignore an entire
dimension of human activity and meaning.” 106 Some of these scholars propose that
the Supreme Court reexamine its decision in Smith and recognize that “the Free
Exercise Clause, by its very terms and read in the light of its historic purposes,
guarantees that believers of every faith, and not just the majority, are able to practice
their religion without unnecessary interference from the government.” 107 Others
propose another approach—namely, restoring a more active scrutiny of free exercise
99. Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
100. Under Smith, the Supreme Court will invalidate as unconstitutional a law that “targets” religion
by discriminating against religious practices or that is not “generally applicable” because it is
underinclusive with regard to the state’s asserted interests—unless the law survives the compelling
interest test. Id. at 879; see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533-46 (1993).
101. Witte, supra note 85, at 420.
102. Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts,
10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 236 (1998). The details of this extensive debate are beyond the scope of
this article.
103. See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise
Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
104. See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A
Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241 (1995); James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the
Mountaintop, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism].
105. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 104, at 1114-28.
106. Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging PostSmith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 278 (1993).
107. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 104, at 1152. At least four justices have
seemingly indicated an openness to revisiting Smith. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct.
634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (observing that the case potentially raised
free exercise issues but that the petitioner had not asked the Court to “revisit” Smith). The Supreme
Court may take up this question in the October 2020 term. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct.
1104 (2020) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari). Although the Supreme Court has not yet revisited
Smith as of this writing, Congress—with massive bipartisan support—adopted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which codified the Sherbert and Yoder compelling interest test. See Garnett
& Dunlap, supra note 84, at 258, 268-69. RFRA, however, only applies to challenges to federal law,
not state law. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (concluding that RFRA exceeded
the scope of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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claims under state constitutions.108
This latter call did not go entirely unheeded. Likely because of the scholarly
debate regarding the propriety of constitutionally mandated exemptions under the
First Amendment, “Smith forced a useful reexamination by states and state courts of
their own constitutions,” specifically, “what liberties and values do . . . state
constitutions—which are organic, constitutive documents—protect?”109 Very
quickly after the Supreme Court’s Smith decision, state courts began to examine
anew the guarantees to free exercise of religion contained in their own state
constitutions.110 Some states have chosen to forego an independent approach.111 At
least ten states, however, have declined to follow Smith and continue to find
accommodations to be constitutionally mandated.112
Maine’s closest neighbors illustrate this divergent response. Although both New
Hampshire and Massachusetts have free exercise clauses similar to the one contained
in Maine’s Declaration of Rights, 113 New Hampshire has followed Smith while
Massachusetts has interpreted its constitution as having separate vitality.114 For its
part, New Hampshire has expressly relied upon Smith in denying a free exercise
claim brought under the state constitution by a defendant seeking to modify his
probation conditions. Without analyzing the text or history of the state constitution
at all, New Hampshire’s Supreme Court reasoned that the free exercise claim must
fail because the probation condition was “facially neutral.”115 Massachusetts has
followed a different course. In a case involving a free exercise challenge to a state
statute prohibiting discrimination on account of marital status, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court noted that it should “reach its own conclusions on the scope

108. See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 106, at 279.
109. Piero A. Tozzi, Whither Free Exercise: Employment Division v. Smith and the Rebirth of State
Constitutional Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence, 48 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 269, 276 (2009).
110. Christine Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevancy of State
Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 365-66 (2004); Crane, supra note 102, at 24451; see Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their
Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 1032-49
(1994).
111. Linton, supra note 14, at 186.
112. Id.; see Witte, supra note 85, at 374-75.
113. The New Hampshire Constitution is very similar to that of Maine. Article V of the New
Hampshire Declaration of Rights states: “Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession, sentiments, or
persuasion; provided he doth not disturb the public peace or disturb others in their religious worship.”
N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. V. Massachusetts has two free exercise provisions—Article 2 of the Declaration
of Rights (“Article 2”) and Article 46, Section 1 of the amendments to the state constitution (“Article
46”). See Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235, 241 (Mass. 1994). The text of Article 46 is
similar to the text of the First Amendment. See MASS. CONST. amend. art. 46 § 1. Article 2 is similar to
Section 3 of Maine’s Declaration of Rights. See MASS. CONST., pt. II, art. II (stating, in part: “[N]o
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession
or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious
worship”).
114. See Linton, supra note 14, at 137-44, 159.
115. State v. Perfetto, 7 A.3d 1179, 1182-83 (N.H. 2010).
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of the protections” afforded under the state constitution “and should not necessarily
follow the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court . . . under the First
Amendment.”116 Relying primarily on its own precedent applying the compelling
interest test, the court chose to “adhere to the standards of [its] earlier . . .
jurisprudence.”117
In sum, following Smith, academic and judicial approaches to free exercise have
fractured. It remains uncertain whether a consistent line of state cases will ultimately
reinvigorate the protections that were rolled back by Smith.118 There is no question,
however, that the divergence of scholarly and judicial analysis has provided fertile
ground for independent analysis of state constitutions.
2. A More Stable Maine Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence
It is in this context that the Maine Law Court’s free exercise jurisprudence has
developed. The Law Court adopted the pre-Smith analysis as a matter of Maine law
in its 1988 Blount decision.119 The court has adhered to that analysis even after the
Supreme Court’s departure from it, as can be seen in a series of cases culminating in
Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland.120 As Professor Tinkle has observed,
“[i]n the area of free exercise of religion, state and federal law have diverged.”121 By
maintaining continuity in its approach to Article I, Section 3 before and after Smith,
the Law Court has provided analytical stability, which is lacking under federal law,
and has maintained the availability of constitutionally mandated accommodations of
religion as a matter of state law.
a. Blount v. Department of Educational and Cultural Services
In Blount v. Department of Educational and Cultural Services, the Law Court
adopted an interpretation of Article I, Section 3 that coincided with the free exercise
analysis used by the Supreme Court in Sherbert and Yoder.122 In Blount, parents

116. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235.
117. Id. at 236-41; see Magazu v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 42 N.E.3d 1107, 1117 n.10 (Mass.
2016). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the two free exercise provisions in its
constitution as providing distinct and separate protections. See id. at 236-37, 242-43. Its holding
rejecting Smith came in the context of Article 46 rather than Article 2. See Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235
(rejecting Smith despite textual similarity between Article 46 and the First Amendment). Somewhat
ironically, therefore, Massachusetts departed from Smith in interpreting a text similar to the First
Amendment, while the New Hampshire Supreme Court followed Smith in interpreting a very different
text. Massachusetts’ treatment of Article 2 is discussed further infra, at Part II(B)(2).
118. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free Exercise in the States: Belief, Conduct, and Judicial
Benchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059, 1066-67 (2000).
119. Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1379, 1385 (Me. 1988).
120. See infra Part II(A)(2)(d); Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d
1208.
121. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 31; see Linton, supra note 14, at
134 (noting that the Maine Law Court “has departed from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause as set forth in Employment Division v. Smith, preferring, instead, to adhere to the preSmith jurisprudence”); Crane, supra note 102, at 245, 249 (noting that the Maine Law Court has
continued to apply heightened scrutiny even after Smith).
122. See TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 31-32; Linton, supra note 14,
at 134-35.
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brought suit challenging a state regulation requiring them to obtain prior approval of
the home schooling instruction they provided to their children. 123 Among other
claims, the parents brought a free exercise challenge under both the United States
and Maine Constitutions.124
In the context of the federal free exercise challenge, the Law Court applied “a
four-stage framework” under the Free Exercise Clause. 125 Citing Yoder, the Law
Court concluded that a person challenging a government regulation as a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause bears the burden of showing: “1) that the activity burdened
by the regulation is motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; and 2) that the
challenged regulation constrains the free exercise of that religious belief.” 126 If the
challenger makes these showings, the state must prove both “3) that the challenged
regulation is motivated by a compelling public interest; and 4) that no less restrictive
means can adequately achieve that compelling public interest.”127 The court found
that the parents had established that the state law substantially burdened their
religious beliefs. The court also concluded, however, that the State’s interest in
ensuring a quality education for children was “so essential that the [parents’] loss in
[religious] freedom [was] clearly outweighed by the benefit,” even though religious
liberty itself is a “compelling public interest[].”128 Finally, the court found that the
regulation was the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s interests.129
The Law Court then turned to the parents’ claim under the Maine Constitution,
using the same four-part framework. The court—perhaps loosely following a
parallelism approach130— “conclude[d] that the full range of protection afforded the
[parents] by the Maine Constitution is also available under the United States
Constitution.”131 In the court’s view, the parents’ state claim relied on the premise
that the Maine Constitution “provides more protection for religious practice and less
protection for countervailing public interests than does the” First Amendment, as
interpreted in Yoder.132 The court rejected this premise for two reasons. First, the
Maine Constitution, which specifically provides that a person’s religious freedom
may be curtailed for certain enumerated reasons, could not “be read as giving less
weight to ‘compelling public interests’ than does the unqualified language of the

123. Blount, 551 A.2d at 1378-79.
124. Id. at 1379, 1385.
125. Id. at 1379.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1381.
129. Id. at 1379-85.
130. The Law Court did not fully explain its reasons for adopting the Sherbert/Yoder test in Blount
and some of its language suggests a parallelism approach. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine
whether the Law Court adopted the Sherbert/Yoder test through independent analysis (consistent with
the primacy approach) or by conflating Section 3 with the First Amendment (consistent with the
parallelism approach). The lack of clarity on this point is ultimately irrelevant because the Law Court
later applied the primacy approach in Fortin.
131. Blount, 551 A.2d at 1385. This was not the first time that the Law Court relied on the Sherbert
formulation. See Dotter v. Me. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 435 A.2d 1368, 1372-74 (Me. 1981); Osier v.
Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1030-31 (Me. 1980). In Blount, however, the Court tied it to the Maine
Constitution.
132. Blount, 551 A.2d at 1385.
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First Amendment forbidding any ‘law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’”133
Further, the Law Court observed that the framers of the Maine Constitution had “laid
upon the legislature . . . the obligation to see that suitable provision is made for the
support and maintenance of public schools” in a section that “has no federal
counterpart.”134 The court thus rejected the state claim. Nevertheless, the Law
Court’s Blount test—which incorporated the Supreme Court’s familiar
Sherbert/Yoder analysis—would define the Law Court’s free exercise jurisprudence
going forward.
b. Rupert v. City of Portland
Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, the Law Court declined
to revisit the free exercise test it had adopted in Blount.135 In Rupert v. City of
Portland, the Law Court’s first post-Smith free exercise case, the court considered a
claim that state drug laws infringed upon religious freedom. 136 The court held that
Blount was “controlling authority . . . so far as the Maine Constitution [was]
concerned.”137 Because the court concluded that Maine had a compelling public
interest in preventing the distribution and use of illegal drugs and that the law was
the least restrictive means of accomplishing that compelling purpose, the court stated
that it had “no reason . . . to decide” whether—in interpreting Section 3—it would
“change course to follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Smith.”138 Although the Law
Court declined to decide this issue, its choice to apply the Blount test in a case that
closely paralleled Smith foreshadowed its later departure from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.139
c. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland
Following its decision in Rupert, the Law Court again signaled its continued
adherence to the Blount balancing test in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland—albeit in a different context.140 In Swanson, a husband and wife brought
an action against a priest and the Catholic Church as a result of the priest’s alleged
sexual liaison with the wife, asserting claims against the priest for infliction of
emotional distress and against the church for negligent supervision.141 After the
church moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on constitutional grounds, the
Superior Court granted the motion in part and reported the case to the Law Court for
interlocutory review pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 72(c).142 The legal
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 32.
136. Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 64 (Me. 1992); see Linton, supra note 14, at 135.
137. Rupert, 605 A.2d at 65.
138. Id. at 65-66 & n.3.
139. See Crane, supra note 102, at 245 n.74 (“Whatever questions the court intended to reserve, it
clearly departed from the Smith approach in its reasoning, if not in its outcome.”); Levy, supra note 110,
at 1047 (observing that the Law Court’s decision in Rupert indicated its “commit[ment] to its traditional
four-stage framework for analyzing free exercise claims.”).
140. See Swanson v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 1997 ME 63, 692 A.2d 441.
141. Id. ¶¶ 1-4.
142. Id. ¶ 5.
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issue presented to the Law Court was whether a negligent supervision claim against
a church could survive under the federal and state constitutions. 143
Without distinguishing between the federal and state free exercise provisions,
the Law Court relied upon the well-established rule that courts may only adjudicate
church-related disputes that can be resolved by neutral principles without
consideration of church doctrine.144 The court concluded that a claim of negligent
supervision would likely require an examination of church doctrine regarding how it
governs its clergy and infringe upon the ecclesiastical relationship between the
church and its pastoral staff. 145 Although it did not directly cite Blount, the court
echoed its balancing test by concluding that “imposing a secular duty of supervision
on the church and enforcing that duty through civil liability would restrict its freedom
to interact with its clergy in the manner deemed proper by ecclesiastical authorities
and would not serve a societal interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedom
inhibited.”146 In so stating, the court implicitly reaffirmed the compelling interest
test and signaled its hesitance to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.147
But again, in Swanson, the Law Court did not speak definitively regarding Smith.
d. Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland
The Law Court was not presented with an opportunity to directly consider the
post-Smith vitality of its Blount formulation until 2005.148 Once given that

143. See id. ¶ 7.
144. Id. ¶ 8.
145. Id. ¶¶ 10-12.
146. Id. ¶ 13.
147. The Law Court’s hesitance is notable in light of the fact that various scholars have argued that
Smith undermines the principle of church autonomy, a doctrine prohibiting courts from reviewing
“internal church disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and policy.” Andrew
Soukup, Note, Reformulating Church Autonomy: How Employment Division v. Smith Provides a
Framework for Fixing the Neutral Principles Approach, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1679, 1680 (2007)
(quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002)); see
Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU. L.
REV. 1099, 1193-95 (2004) (arguing that Smith should be extended to eliminate the ministerial
exception). The Law Court did not take this path, but instead relied on pre-Smith precedent prohibiting
courts from resolving questions of church polity and governance. See Parent v. Roman Cath. Bishop of
Portland, 436 A.2d 888, 890-91 (Me. 1981). The Law Court’s decision implicitly accepted the
argument that Smith should not apply in church autonomy cases. See generally Joshua D. Dunlap, Note,
When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2005, 2031 n.153 (2007) (discussing the distinction between the theories underlying
individual and institutional free exercise claims); Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 1715, 1722 (2004) (“Smith is inapplicable to the traditional doctrines of religious institutional
autonomy. . . .”). The Supreme Court itself has accepted this view. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (declining to extend Smith to “internal
church decision[s] that affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself”).
148. While the Law Court reviewed a free exercise challenge to Maine’s tuition program in 1999,
the parties to that case did “not contend that the Maine Constitution affords greater protection than the
United States Constitution.” The Court therefore proceeded “with the understanding that the rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Maine Constitution are coextensive.” Bagley v.
Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 13, 728 A.2d 127. The court applied the Blount test, noting that
the law at issue was not “neutral on its face” and was thus subject to the compelling interest test even
after Smith. Id. ¶ 16 n.10; see also Linton, supra note 14, at 135.
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opportunity, the court “indicated that the Blount analysis applied under the Maine
Constitution and was more rigorous than the US Supreme Court’s current test under
the Federal Constitution’s free exercise clause.”149 Specifically, in Fortin v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland, the court reviewed an appeal of the Superior Court’s
decision to grant the church’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary
duty and negligent supervision claims against the church arising from allegations of
sexual abuse.150 The Law Court reversed, concluding that the complaint stated
sufficient facts to survive dismissal. 151 The court took up, and ultimately rejected,
the church’s argument that a recognition of a fiduciary relationship would
“necessarily infringe on its free exercise of religion in violation of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Maine
Constitution.”152
In analyzing the First Amendment defense, the Law Court applied the Smith test,
noting that a neutral, generally applicable law that does not have the “object” of
prohibiting the exercise of religion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 153 The
court observed, however, that the question of whether a law is “neutral” is one that
itself remained somewhat unsettled. The Law Court took note of the debate over
whether a law must only be formally neutral (i.e., a law that does not have as its
object discrimination against religion) or whether a law must also be substantively
neutral (i.e., a law that does not burden religious individuals more than it burdens
others).154 The court declined to weigh in on this dispute, finding that the First
Amendment defense failed under either approach because the church did not
“identify a specific religious doctrine or practice that will be burdened if [the
plaintiff’s] claim is not dismissed.”155
The Law Court then separately took up the defense raised under Section 3 of the
Declaration of Rights, noting that the church had argued that “Article I, Section 3 of
the Maine Constitution is more protective of religious liberty than is the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”156 The court observed that the church was
“correct that Blount’s and Rupert’s formulation of the standard applied to free
exercise claims” was “akin to the more rigorous standard” in Yoder.157 The court
went on to note that it had, in Rupert, “expressly acknowledged that [it] w[as] not
149. TINKLE, MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 32; see Linton, supra note 14, at 136.
150. Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶¶ 3-4, 871 A.2d 1208.
151. Id. ¶ 12.
152. Id. ¶ 40.
153. Id. ¶ 42. The Law Court applied the Smith test in the context of a free exercise claim raised by
a religious institution because the institution itself relied on Smith and its progeny as support for its
claim. Id. ¶ 41. It is apparently for this reason that Smith, rather than the church autonomy cases,
guided the Law Court’s analysis. That arguably did not make any difference, however, because the
claimant never identified religious doctrines or practices upon which the asserted claim would intrude.
Id. ¶ 52.
154. Id. ¶¶ 44-48 (discussing the views of neutrality set out by Justice Kennedy in the majority
opinion and Justice Souter in a concurring opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
155. Id. ¶ 51; see also id. ¶¶ 53-54.
156. Id. ¶ 55.
157. Id. ¶¶ 48, 56 (observing that Blount and Rupert were similar to the view of neutrality set out by
Justice Souter in his Lukumi concurrence, which in turn was consistent with “earlier decisions such as
Wisconsin v. Yoder”).
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adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s then recent holding in Smith as part of [the
Court’s] Article I, Section 3 analysis.”158 It also observed that, in Swanson, it—while
“not expressly employ[ing] the Blount analysis”—had reaffirmed “the necessity of
balancing the societal interests and the associated infringement on the free exercise
of religion.”159 Accordingly, utilizing the primacy approach to constitutional
interpretation, the court applied the Blount test in analyzing Article I, Section 3.160
The court ultimately rejected the church’s arguments because the church was not
able to show that the claim would cause the court to burden the free exercise of
religion by, for instance, delving into doctrinal matters. 161 The Fortin decision,
however, made it clear that the Law Court saw Section 3 as providing greater
protection than that afforded under Smith.162
e. Summary
The Law Court’s jurisprudence from Blount to Fortin establishes that Section 3
of the Declaration of Rights provides the same protections that the First Amendment
was understood to provide prior to Smith. In Blount, the Law Court endorsed the
availability of constitutionally-mandated exemptions, thereby rejecting the notion
that neutral, generally applicable laws necessarily pass muster under Section 3. 163
Blount established that Section 3 was co-extensive with the First Amendment as
158. Id. ¶ 56.
159. Id. ¶ 57.
160. Id. ¶¶ 58-69.
161. Id. ¶ 61.
162. Although the Court did not uphold the free exercise claim, its application of the compelling
interest test indicates that free exercise claims brought under the Declaration of Rights are more likely to
succeed than those brought under the First Amendment. See Linton, supra note 14, at 136.
163. The Blount decision implicitly discarded the crabbed reading of Section 3 adopted in Donahoe
v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 409-13 (1854). In that case, the Law Court refused to mandate an
accommodation of religion, permitting a Catholic student to be expelled from school because she
wished to be exempted from participation in the reading of a Protestant Bible—which she believed to be
a sin. Donahoe, 38 Me. at 386. Donahoe was decided as anti-Catholic prejudice swept the country,
including New England. See Richard D. Komer, Trinity Lutheran and the Future of Educational
Choice: Implications for State Blaine Amendments, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 551, 558-59
(2018); see also Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2269-73 (2020) (Alito, J.,
concurring); Mark DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins,
Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 561-62 (2003). Donahoe
reflected that prejudice, as evidenced by the shocking persecution visited upon the Donahoe family’s
priest. See Komer, supra, at 558 n.49. “After the decision, the Donahoe family’s priest, Father John
Bapst, was tarred and feathered, run out of town on a rail, and threatened with being burned at the stake;
the chapel he had officiated in was also set on fire.” Id. Donahoe can fairly be read as an attempt to
induce by judicial means changes in Catholic teaching. See Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation,
Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645,
1679, n.165 (2004). Donahoe’s anti-Catholic context provides some explanation for the decision’s
departure from prior cases acknowledging the principle of constitutionally mandated accommodations.
See Wesley J. Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious Exemption Cases, 63
STAN. L. REV. 973, 990-1001 (2011) (contrasting Donahoe with prior exemption cases and noting that it
marked “a clear departure from their logic and scope”). Donahoe is more a remnant of political
suppression of freedom of religion than an exposition of that doctrine and illustrates the shortcomings of
the Smith “neutrality” rule. Blount appropriately left this embarrassing judicial aberration behind in
favor of an interpretation of Section 3 that is supported by the text and history of the Declaration of
Rights. See infra Part II(B).
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interpreted by Sherbert and Yoder—not necessarily because the state free exercise
clause must be interpreted to mean the same thing as its federal counterpart, but rather
because it should be so interpreted. In later cases, the Law Court indicated that
Blount had retained its vitality. In Fortin, the Law Court again endorsed the Blount
test and made known its disagreement with Smith. In so doing, the Law Court
necessarily reaffirmed both the primacy approach and its view that Section 3 of the
Declaration of Rights contains more expansive protections than are provided under
the First Amendment after Smith.
B. Textual Analysis of Article I, Section 3
The text of Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights strongly supports the Law
Court’s decision to chart an independent course after Smith. The language used by
the framers in Section 3 is consistent with the Law Court’s Blount test and the
availability of constitutionally mandated accommodations of religion. By setting
forth a clause guaranteeing religious liberty, a proviso ensuring that religious liberty
claims are not permitted to disturb the public peace or religious liberties of others,
and a separate clause guaranteeing equal protection, Section 3 makes it clear that the
Maine Constitution does more than prevent religious discrimination. Instead, it
expressly contemplates exemptions from generally applicable laws for religious
believers, subject only to the most compelling of state interests.
1. The Text: Different than the First Amendment
Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights is worded differently than its federal
counterpart in the First Amendment. This simple fact is of critical salience. In
interpreting the Maine Constitution, state courts must “look primarily to the language
used.”164 Accordingly, different words used in one constitutional text than another
may lead a court to conclude that the scope of the rights guaranteed by that text is
different from the scope of the rights guaranteed by the other.
In the context of the federal and state Religion Clauses, the constitutional
language is significantly different. The familiar words of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment are succinct: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”165 Section 3 of
the Declaration of Rights, by contrast, is far lengthier:
All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt,
molested or restrained in that person’s liberty or estate for worshipping God in the

164. Voorhees v. Sagadahoc Cnty., 2006 ME 79, ¶ 6, 900 A.2d 733; see Op. of the Justices, 2015
ME 107, ¶ 35, 123 A.3d 494. It is most appropriate to “look to the interpretation of constitutional
provisions undertaken by other courts when the constitutional language at issue is similar or drawn from
similar historical passages.” Op. of the Justices, 2015 ME 107, ¶ 40, 123 A.3d 494.
165. U.S. CONST., amend. I. The United States Constitution also contains a prohibition on religious
tests for public office but locates that prohibition elsewhere. See id. art. VI, cl. 3 (“no religious test shall
ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States”). The “no
religious test” clause, though not placed within the First Amendment, nevertheless provides critical
protection for free exercise of religion. See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of
Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1578 (1989).
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manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that person’s own conscience,
nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments, provided that that person
does not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship—
and all persons demeaning themselves peaceably, as good members of the State,
shall be equally under the protection of the laws, and no subordination nor
preference of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by
law, nor shall any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or trust,
under this State; and all religious societies in this State, whether incorporate or
unincorporate, shall at all times have the exclusive right of electing their public
teachers, and contracting with them for their support and maintenance.166

A close analysis of Section 3 of Maine’s Declaration of Rights demonstrates that the
provision is considerably more specific than the First Amendment.
Section 3 consists of several constituent parts. First, and of most pertinence to
this Article, is the free exercise clause.167 This clause sets out the basic principle that
every individual has the unalienable right to worship God according to his or her
conscience, and that no individual’s liberty may be curtailed as the result of the
exercise of this right. The free exercise clause also contains a proviso limiting the
scope of religious liberty by precluding religious believers from asserting a right to
disturb the public peace or inhibit the religious liberties of others. Second, Section
3 contains an equal protection clause, requiring that individuals be provided the equal
protection of the laws regardless of their religious beliefs and practices. 168 Third,
Section 3 contains an establishment clause prohibiting legal recognition of any
particular religious denomination.169 Fourth, Section 3 contains a religious test
clause.170 This provision prohibits the establishment of any religious test for public
office. Fifth, Section 3 contains a ministerial exception clause preventing the state
from interfering with a religious institution’s choice of its teachers. 171
The very specific language of Section 3 does not necessarily mean that the
framers chose to provide restraints on state government more extensive than the
restraints already placed on the federal government by the First Amendment. For
example, while the First Amendment does not contain separate clauses guaranteeing
equal protection and prohibiting government intervention in the hiring practices of
religious institutions, the First Amendment can—and should—be read to address
these issues. The Supreme Court, for instance, has held that laws “may not single
out the religious for disfavored treatment,” and has struck down discriminatory
166. ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.
167. “All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt, molested or restrained in that person’s
liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that
person’s own conscience, nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments, provided that that
person does not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship . . . .” Id.
168. “[A]ll persons demeaning themselves peaceably, as good members of the State, shall be equally
under the protection of the laws, . . . .” Id.
169. “[N]o subordination nor preference of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be
established by law. . . .” Id.
170. “[N]or shall any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or trust, under this
State; . . . .” Id.
171. “[A]ll religious societies in this State, whether incorporate or unincorporate, shall at all times
have the exclusive right of electing their public teachers, and contracting with them for their support and
maintenance.” Id.
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schemes disfavoring religious entities and believers.172 The Supreme Court has also
held that the First Amendment does indeed prohibit the government from interfering
in certain employment decisions by religious institutions.173 Even as to the issue of
constitutionally mandated exemptions, there is strong historical evidence that the
First Amendment was originally understood to require accommodations of
religion—contrary to Smith.174
The text of Section 3 does demonstrate, however, that the framers chose to
delineate the various aspects of religious liberty more precisely than the First
Amendment. Thus, to use two examples just considered, the framers chose to
explicitly state that religious liberty includes an equal protection guarantee as well
as a ministerial exception. The benefits of having enumerated the different aspects
of religious liberty are significant. In the context of ministerial exception claims, for
example, the specificity of the Maine Constitution ensured that courts recognized
protections for religious institutions as a matter of state law long before the Supreme
Court addressed the existence of the ministerial exception as a matter of federal
law.175 In the context of constitutionally mandated accommodation of religion, the
specificity of Section 3 short-circuits the debate over Smith. The framers’ choice of
language means that, unlike the First Amendment, the existence of mandatory
exemptions does not have to be determined based on the principles underlying a
sparse text or historical evidence regarding that text’s original meaning (as
compelling as such principles or evidence might be). Instead, it can be determined
based on the text of Section 3.
2. The Text: A Balancing Test
In addition to guaranteeing equal protection and providing a safe harbor for

172. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2020-25 (2017); see
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2255-57 (2020). Equal protection, in fact,
forms the core of the First Amendment’s protection of free exercise after Smith. See Trinity Lutheran,
137 S. Ct. at 2020-21. Even if the Free Exercise Clause should be read to encompass more than an
equal protection principle, there is sound reason to conclude that equal protection of religious
individuals and groups is an important element of the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the
Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 965-66 (2013) (“The Religion Clauses of
the original Constitution and of the federal Bill of Rights were . . . consistent with the Lockean principle
of allowing only general rules applicable to all religions only on similar terms.”); Witte, supra note 85,
at 398-99.
173. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188-89 (2012).
This conclusion is supported by the history of the First Amendment. See Dunlap, supra note 147, at
2015-25 (discussing the historical justification for the ministerial exception under the First
Amendment).
174. Professor McConnell, who conducted perhaps the most extensive historical study of the Free
Exercise Clause and constitutionally-mandated accommodations of religion, concluded that the
“doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more consistent with the original understanding than is a
position that leads only to the facial neutrality of legislation.” McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82,
at 1512. But cf. Hamburger, supra note 103, at 947-48.
175. Courts recognized the ministerial exception under the Maine Constitution decades prior to the
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89; Graffam
v. Wray, 437 A.3d 627, 635 n.11 (Me. 1981) (citing Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 36 F. Supp.
918, 926 (D. Me. 1940), aff’d, 124 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941)).
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religious institutions’ right to choose their ministers, the framers of the Maine
Constitution expressly adopted protections for the free exercise of religion that
balanced the burden placed on free exercise against the state interests justifying that
burden. Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights defines both the scope of free exercise
and its limits.176 It expressly acknowledges that religious liberty protects not only
beliefs but also conduct. It also recognizes, however, that a limited set of state
interests, such as the interest in public peace and safety, may prevail over a claim of
religious liberty. The framers thus built into the text a balancing test—comparable
to the Sherbert and Yoder test—that contemplates constitutionally mandated
accommodations. The text of Section 3 provides no basis for concluding that neutral,
generally applicable laws that substantially burden the free exercise of religion are
constitutional, absent some compelling state interest.
a. The Scope of Religious Liberty: Belief and Conduct
The free exercise clause of Section 3 defines religious liberty broadly. It protects
all individuals’ “natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own consciences” and prohibits restrictions on any “person’s
liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of that person’s own conscience, nor for that person’s religious professions
or sentiments.”177
Under the language of Section 3, religious freedom encompasses both practices
and beliefs.178 The phrase “no person shall be hurt, molested or restrained in that
person’s liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of that person’s own conscience” protects actions while the
phrase “nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments” protects religious
beliefs.179 Thus, as Professor McConnell has explained, the language used in the
Maine Constitution—as with the text of its sister constitutions in Massachusetts and
New Hampshire—defines the scope of free exercise “in terms of the conscience of
the individual believer and the actions that flow from that conscience.” 180 To read
the free exercise clause of Section 3 as protecting only beliefs would render the first
of these two phrases meaningless, contrary to canons of constitutional
interpretation.181
176. Professor McConnell has helpfully explored both the scope and the limitations of similar free
exercise clauses contained in early state constitutions. See McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at
1455-66.
177. ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.
178. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1459.
179. See Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 242 (Mass. 1994) (the reference in Article 2 of
Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights to “worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to
the dictates of his own conscience” refers to and protects “conduct,” while the reference to “religious
profession or sentiments” protects “religious beliefs”).
180. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1458-59; see id. at 1451-52 (noting that, in colonial
America, it was well accepted that liberty of conscience was widely understood to include actions
compelled by conscience: “there could be no such thing as freedom of conscience without freedom to
act”).
181. See Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d 1291, 1297 (Me. 1996) (declining to adopt constitutional
interpretation that would render a provision meaningless). The broad scope of Section 3, protecting not
only beliefs but also conduct motivated by “the dictates of [each] person’s own conscience,” is
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While Section 3 does not define the precise scope of the actions or conduct
protected, there is no reason to conclude that the use of the term “worship” indicates
that religious freedom is limited to protecting the rituals or ceremonial acts of
religion that occur within the four walls of a church building or other house of
worship. The language of Section 3 contains no suggestion that “worship” refers
solely to ceremonial acts; to the contrary, it protects the right of every individual to
worship according “to the dictates of that person’s own conscience.” This language
unambiguously establishes that every individual is free to decide what that worship
entails.182 Further, as Professor McConnell notes, the understanding of the term
“worship,” in the Protestant view dominant during early American history, is
generally indistinguishable “from ‘the duty we owe to our Creator.’”183 In the
Protestant tradition, “‘duties’ to God included actions, perhaps all of life, and not just
speech and opinion.”184 “Worship” is, therefore, any act that is motivated by one’s
religious beliefs. Unsurprisingly, then, “[i]n none of the state free exercise cases in
the early years of the Republic did the lawyers argue or the courts hold that
religiously motivated conduct was unprotected because it was not ‘worship.’” 185 It
is for good reason that Maine courts have never so limited the scope of Section 3.186
b. The Countervailing Interests: Peace or Obstruction
The language of Section 3 strikes a clear constitutional balance between
consistent with the notion that the “right of free exercise precedes and is superior to” civil obligations.
McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1459. This theory of religious liberty is discussed further in
Part II(C)(1).
182. See Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 243-44 (Liacos, C.J., concurring). Indeed, an attempt to distinguish
between what is or is not worship would necessarily entangle courts in inherently religious questions.
Id. at 244 (“The decision by an individual as to what form of religious worship constitutes an
appropriate vehicle by which to pay homage to a chosen object of that worship can hardly be
characterized as anything but a religious belief or sentiment, for it is religious belief which informs, and
serves as the foundation for, that choice. Accordingly, if . . . any court purports to consider whether a
practice is truly a form of worship, then in essence the court is inquiring into the validity of a religious
belief. No civil court, however, may make such an inquiry.”). The Law Court has signaled its hesitance
to engage in such analysis. See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 18, 728 A.2d 127
(noting that courts “should be hesitant to delve into the asserted ‘centrality’ of a religious practice” to an
individual’s beliefs).
183. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1460 (quoting R. MEHL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
PROTESTANTISM 107-08 (J. Farley trans. 1970)).
184. Id. at 1459.
185. Id. at 1461.
186. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, by contrast, has limited that state’s corollary to
Section 3 by drawing a distinction between “the ritual and ceremonial aspects of worship” and “conduct
motivated by sincerely held religious convictions.” Soc’y of Jesus of New Eng. v. Commonwealth, 808
N.E.2d 272, 284-85, 284 n.15 (Mass. 2004) (quoting Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237
(1994)). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted this distinction in an attempt to avoid
conflating Article 2 with Article 46, both of which protect free exercise rights. Id. at 284 (“[I]f all
actions taken based on religious belief qualified as ‘worship[]’ under art. 2, the free exercise clause of
art. 46, § 1, would be superfluous.”). The court did not undertake any analysis of the original
understanding of Article 2 or the reasons for the (much later) adoption of Article 46. Id. at 279-82, 28485. In any event, Maine has no provision similar to Article 46, and thus there is no need to harmonize
what may well be—in the unique context of the Massachusetts Constitution—two overlapping
provisions.
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religious liberty and the rightful exercise of civil authority by stating that the free
exercise of religion is limited by—or, phrased another way, may only be outweighed
by—specified state interests. Section 3 expressly states that the free exercise of
religion may be restricted only if it would “disturb the public peace” or “obstruct
others in their religious worship.”187 By juxtaposing religious liberty against the
state’s interest in preserving “public peace” and protecting the religious liberty of
others, this proviso serves two purposes: confirming the breadth of the protections
under Section 3 and delineating the bounds of free exercise by providing that
compelling state interests may limit religious liberty.
The proviso both confirms that Section 3 protects religious conduct and also
establishes that Section 3 mandates accommodation of religion even in the context
of generally applicable laws. As to the first of these points, the proviso “confirm[s]
that the free exercise right was not understood to be confined to beliefs,” as “[b]eliefs
without more do not have the capacity to disturb the public peace and safety.” 188 As
to the second of these points, the proviso confirms that Section 3 “envisions
religiously compelled exemptions from at least some generally applicable laws.” 189
If Section 3 did no more than create a Smith-like nondiscrimination principle, then
there would be no question that a religious believer is prohibited from engaging in
actions inconsistent with the public peace as outlined by neutral, generally applicable
state laws.190 “In a regime where all generally applicable laws are enforced even
against contrary religious conscience, there is no need to specify that the right” is
limited by the state’s interest in preserving the peace—in short, no need for the
proviso.191 It would be superfluous to expressly limit the constitutional protection
afforded religious conduct that would breach the peace unless Section 3 mandated
exemptions to some generally applicable laws.
The proviso also establishes that religious freedom is subject to certain
limitations while simultaneously creating a high threshold for the government to
meet in order to justify any restrictions on religious liberty. The proviso creates this
high threshold by limiting “the sorts of state interests that may override a demand
for a free exercise exemption.”192 The proviso is tightly circumscribed, comparable
to the third and fourth prongs of the Blount formulation—the compelling interest and
least restrictive means analyses.193 Consistent with the maxim expressio unius est

187. ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.
188. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1462.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?:
A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 819, 831 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Freedom from Persecution]. Justice Scalia criticized this
reading of similar provisos in other state constitutions. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 538540 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his view, any breach of any law is a breach of the peace. Id. Justice
O’Connor, however, agreed that the provisos “would have been superfluous” unless the right to free
exercise was viewed as “generally superior to ordinary legislation.” Id. at 554-55 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
192. Crane, supra note 102, at 263; see Carmella, supra note 106, at 280-81; Stuart G. Parsell, Note,
Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment
Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 765-66 (1993).
193. See Carmella, supra note 106, at 281.

30

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

exclusio alterius,194 the proviso’s enumeration of specific limitations on free exercise
establishes that only a “narrow[] subcategory of the general laws” can overcome an
individual’s right to free exercise.195 The phrase “obstruct others in their religious
worship” prevents privileging one individual’s religious liberty above another’s.
The “public peace” limitation prevents religious claimants from seeking to “invade
the private rights of others or to disturb public peace and order.” 196 Absent some
compelling reason such as the invasion of another’s religious liberty or the
maintenance of public order, religious conduct must be accommodated. 197
A reading of the proviso allowing any generally applicable law to circumscribe
religious liberty does not fit with the text of Section 3. The term “public peace,”
which “refer[s] to the fundamental peacekeeping functions of government,” stands
in contradistinction to broader terms such as “happiness,” which “is a term as
compendious as all of public policy,” and thus only allows a subset of laws—namely,
those essential to maintaining a peaceful society—to outweigh the right to free
194. The enumeration of certain exceptions “implicitly deny the availability of any other.” Nevin v.
Union Tr. Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶ 34, 726 A.2d 694 (quoting Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Me.
1994)).
195. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1462; see Branton J. Nestor, Note, The Original
Meaning and Significance of Early State Provisos to the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 HARV. J. L. PUB.
POL’Y 971, 978-99 (2019) (explaining that “peace and safety” provisos “constituted . . . narrow
exceptions to an otherwise broad free exercise right,” and did not encompass every violation of law).
196. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1464.
197. The Law Court has rejected the argument that Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights provides
even greater protection to free exercise than the compelling interest test. See Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. &
Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988). In so doing, it adopted the generalized balancing test
set forth in Sherbert and Yoder, as other courts have. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City
of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 186-188 (Wash. 1992) (applying compelling interest test). There is an
argument, however, that the proviso identifies the only two state interests that are sufficient to overcome
the right to free exercise and does not create a general balancing test between religious freedom on the
one hand and state interests on the other. See id. at 192 (Utter, J., concurring) (rejecting need for a
balancing test, and concluding that “[o]nly the government’s interest in peace and safety . . . can excuse
an imposition on religious liberty”); Parsell, supra note 192, at 766. As Justice Liacos noted in
considering Massachusetts’ parallel provision, the proviso—read strictly—“guarantees . . . absolute
freedom as to religious belief and liberty unrestrained as to religious practices, subject only to the
conditions that public peace must not be disturbed or others not be obstructed in their religious
worship.” Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1989) (Liacos, J., dissenting).
This reading would further constrain the state interests that might limit free exercise. The scope of the
“obstruction of worship” limitation is relatively self-evident. The scope of the “disturbance of the
peace” limitation—of common law origin—likely refers to the crime of “disturb[ing] the peace of the
public . . . by actions, conduct or utterances, the combination of which constituted a common nuisance.”
Id. at 601 (Liacos, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 269 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1971)).
That is, disturbance of the peace consists of “conduct which tends to annoy all good citizens and does in
fact annoy anyone present not favoring it.” Id. (Liacos, J., dissenting); see id. (Liacos, J., dissenting)
(noting that the conduct must be “unreasonably disruptive” to most people and must also “infringe on
someone’s right to be undisturbed”); Soc’y of Jesus of New Eng. v. Bos. Landmarks Comm’n, 564
N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (Mass. 1990) (adopting Justice Liacos’ construction of “disturbing the peace” and
implicitly overruling Nissenbaum’s broader reading equating that phrase to any violation of the law).
Under Justice Liacos’s approach, if either the obstruction of worship or the disturbance of the peace
limitation applies, then the religious liberty claim would fail. If neither limitation applies, then the
religious liberty claim would prevail without any balancing of interests. This approach would
substantially clarify what is an otherwise somewhat open-ended balancing test. See State v.
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990); McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1464.
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exercise.198 In addition, were the proviso construed to permit any law of general
applicability to constrain free exercise, the exception would swallow Section 3’s
general rule that religious conduct is protected.199 Further, if the proviso were
construed to subject free exercise to any generally applicable exercise of legislative
power, thereby creating a Smith-like guarantee precluding discrimination but not
permitting exemptions from generally applicable laws, it would render the equal
protection clause of Section 3 superfluous: that clause already expressly prevents
discriminatory targeting of religious believers.
In short, Section 3 establishes that only compelling government interests are
sufficient to overcome the fundamental right to freedom of religion and embodies
more than a nondiscrimination principle. Section 3, and, specifically, the proviso
limiting the free exercise of religion, creates a Sherbert/Yoder-style balancing test to
determine whether accommodations of religion are constitutionally mandated.
Religiously motivated conduct is protected, subject only to the strongest of state
interests. Absent such an interest, a believer should be exempted from a generally
applicable law that substantially burdens his or her exercise of religion. Section 3
includes, but is not limited to, a guarantee of equal protection.
C. Historical Analysis of Article I, Section 3
Several different conceptions of religious liberty influenced the state
constitutions adopted in the early United States.200 These views informed the debate
over Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights, which was one of the longest debates of
Maine’s constitutional convention.201 As this debate suggests, Section 3 embodies
an expansive understanding of religious liberty that protects both belief and conduct,
and therefore contemplates accommodations of religion—consistent with Blount and
the above textual analysis. The framers did not endorse the narrower conception of
198. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1463. The term “public peace” was chosen despite
the frequent use of broader terms, such as “the public good,” when used to describe the scope of
legislative power. Had the framers truly meant to subject free exercise to ordinary legislation, they
would have used a broad term like “the public good.” Accordingly, the best reading of the term “public
peace” is that it is “confined to public disorder and violent or tortious injury to other persons.”
McConnell, Freedom from Persecution, supra note 191, at 835-37; see Nestor, supra note 195, at 99293 (noting that “early state governments’ constitutional powers extended beyond securing the ‘peace
and safety’ of the state”). Further, “the terms ‘peace’ and ‘safety’ were historically defined by colonial
charters and Founding-era dictionaries and commentaries to fall short of encompassing ‘all laws.’”
Nestor, supra note 195, at 982.
199. See Carmella, supra note 106, at 306-07.
200. Professor Witte has identified four such views, which he categorizes as follows: Puritan,
Evangelical, Enlightenment, and Civic Republican. See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL NICHOLS, RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 21-37 (4th ed. 2016); Witte, supra note 85, at 37689. Some have debated the usefulness of this taxonomy, arguing that there was broad consensus on
liberty of conscience as an unalienable right. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 384-98 (2002). Witte’s analysis, however, usefully
distills distinctions among those with different views of the scope of religious liberty and is not
inconsistent with the notion that liberty of conscience was widely supported. See Adams & Emmerich,
supra note 165, at 1582-95, 1599-1600 (classifying three views roughly consistent with the
classifications adopted by Witte and noting commonalities).
201. HATCH, supra note 2, at 152; see TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at
7.
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free exercise exemplified by Smith and, ultimately, adopted a provision that “gave
full liberty of conscience and of worship.”202 Indeed, the provision adopted by the
convention has been described as guaranteeing “absolute freedom of religion.”203
Constitutional history therefore supports the Blount test and confirms that Section 3
is incompatible with Smith.
1. Section 3 and Free Exercise as an Unalienable Right
The text of Section 3 reflects a “theological view” of free exercise that stands in
contradistinction to the “Enlightenment view” underlying Smith. Under the
Enlightenment view, often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, “the right to the free
exercise of religious belief [is] beyond the reach of governmental control,” but, in
contrast, government can “control religious conduct that might conflict with
otherwise neutral general laws.”204 This view is reflected in Smith. Regardless of
the propriety of interpreting the First Amendment in accord with this view, “many
. . . state constitutions embody broader understandings of religious liberty,”
understandings advanced by—among others—James Madison.205 In Madison’s
view, religious liberty is an unalienable right (not a matter of mere toleration), that
protects conduct (not just beliefs) and is limited only by the necessity of preserving
public order.206 Madison’s view, as will be seen, tracks closely with Section 3 of the
Maine Declaration of Rights.
Madison’s view can be traced back to evangelical groups, Baptists prominent
among them, who asserted a “theological view” of free exercise. 207 Proponents of
the theological view called for “free exercise” of religion and “full and equal rights
of conscience” because “religious liberty is a pre-political, fundamental human
right.”208 They also emphasized the voluntary nature of religious convictions. 209
Under the theological view, civil government has no authority over matters of
conscience because religious duties take precedence over civil duties and must be
left to the conviction of every individual. 210 Because “civil obligations are
subordinate to religious duty,” then “where possible, those religious practices that

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

HATCH, supra note 2, at 152.
TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 7; BANKS, supra note 2, at 155.
Durham, supra note 110, at 353.
Id. at 354.
See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 86 (2002) (Madison’s conception of religious freedom departed “from the oldworld regime of religious toleration, in which religious exercise was a mere privilege that the civil state
could grant or revoke at its pleasure”); Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of
Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455, 505-12 (1991); McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at
1443-44, 1452-53, 1464.
207. The author uses the term “theological view” because it expressly relied on religious
justifications for religious liberty. Dunlap, supra note 147, at 2019 & n.84; see Steven D. Smith, The
Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154 (1991).
Professor Witte refers to it as the “evangelical view.” Witte, supra note 85, at 381.
208. Durham, supra note 110, at 359; see McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1443; Witte,
supra note 85, at 382.
209. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 200, at 26, 28.
210. Smith, supra note 207, at 153-61; see McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1437-43,
1453; Witte, supra note 85, at 382.
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conflict with civil law” are to be accommodated. 211 That this view has fallen out of
common jurisprudential discourse does not minimize its importance in the
development of religious liberty in the fledgling United States, 212 nor its continuing
relevance.213
Proponents of the theological view argued that government is not a competent
authority in matters of conscience because the demands of God on man’s conscience
are supreme over all other demands and because matters of conscience, by their
nature, entail freedom of choice. Roger Williams—the Baptist dissenter and founder
of Rhode Island, who apprenticed under the renowned jurist Sir Edward Coke and
authored an early defense of the principle of liberty of conscience in the colonies 214—
asserted that the “civil sword” is “of a material civil nature” and therefore “cannot,
according to its utmost reach and capacity . . ., I say, cannot extend to spiritual”
matters.215 He contended that matters of religious conscience were not entrusted to
the oversight of government.216 According to Isaac Backus, a Baptist preacher who
is credited with the disestablishment of the state church in Massachusetts217 and who
authored a major treatise on religious liberty in 1773,218 “nothing can be true religion
but a voluntary obedience unto [God’s] revealed will, of which each rational soul has
an equal right to judge for itself.” 219 Therefore, Backus argued, “every person has
an unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of
his own mind.”220 Their argument was echoed by others.221 James Madison distilled
211. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 561 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
212. Most proponents of free exercise of religion “were members of the most fervent and
evangelical denominations in the nation.” McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1437. “The drive
for religious freedom was part of [the] evangelical movement” that swept the colonies near the
Revolution. Id. at 1438. The view therefore “carried considerable weight with Americans of the
founding generation.” Smith, supra note 207, at 156.
213. Smith, supra note 207, at 153-68, 196-223 (summarizing the importance of the theological
view and arguing that it cannot adequately be replaced).
214. See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams’ Gift: Religious Freedom in America, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 429, 435-36 (1999).
215. Id. at 457 (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenet of Persecution).
216. See id. at 441-43, 457-58; Hall, supra note 206, at 469-74.
217. See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early
American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1432-48 (2004).
218. William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and State in America, 73
AM. HIST. REV. 1392, 1405-06 (1968).
219. Id. at 1403 (quoting Isaac Backus, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of
Massachusetts-Bay); see Witte, supra note 85, at 382.
220. McLoughlin, supra note 218, at 1403.
221. John Leland, Baptist preacher and close ally to James Madison, argued that “every man ought
to be at liberty to serve God in a way that he can best reconcile to his conscience.” Timothy L. Hall,
Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 34, n.164 (1992) (quoting John Leland, Right of
Conscience Inalienable); see Mark S. Scarberry, John Leland and James Madison: Religious Influence
on the Ratification of the Constitution and on the Proposal of the Bill of Rights, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV.
733, 797-98 (2009) (noting John Leland’s influence on James Madison and the importance of his
contributions to the debate over religious liberty). The evangelical Presbyterian preacher Israel Evans,
who was a contemporary of James Madison at the College of New Jersey, exhorted the New Hampshire
Legislature that “[r]eligious liberty is a divine right immediately derived from the Supreme Being,
without the intervention of any created authority. It is the natural privilege of worshipping God in that
manner which, according to the judgment of men, is most agreeable and pleasing to the divine
character.” Israel Evans, A Sermon Delivered at Concord, Before the Hon. General Court of the State of
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it as follows: “‘the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and
such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him’ is ‘precedent, both in order of time
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society’ and ‘therefore that in
matters of Religion, no man’s right is abridged by any institution of Civil
Society.’”222
Proponents of the theological view, however, also recognized the rightful sphere
of civil government and accordingly advocated setting limits on the outer bounds of
religious liberty.223 Roger Williams, firebrand though he was, contended that the
“civil sword” is a “sword of civil justice,” and is rightly used “for the defense of
persons, estates[,] families, liberties of a city or civil state, and the suppressing of
uncivil or injurious persons.”224 Isaac Backus argued only that “every person has an
inalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of his
own mind, where others are not injured thereby.”225 Again, this theme was
consistently echoed by proponents of the theological view. 226 Madison expressed it
this way: the right to free exercise should prevail “in every case where it does not
trespass on private rights or the public peace.”227
Williams and Backus are of particular importance to the development of
religious freedom in New England. Williams’s writings “provide a framework of
argument and theory that is more comprehensive than those of any other writer prior
to the constitutional period.”228 Williams established a “theoretical foundation that
would justify the constitutional protection of religion and that would elaborate a basis
for determining the limits of that protection.”229 His arguments informed those of

New Hampshire at the Annual Election, reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
ERA 1062-63 (Sandoz, ed. 1991); see Witte, supra note 85, at 382.
222. Durham, supra note 111, at 359 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 188 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)); see
McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1453.
223. See McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1465.
224. Eberle, supra note 214, at 457 (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenet of Persecution); see
Hall, supra note 206, at 478-87 (describing Williams’ argument that both the government and
conscience are subject to limitations).
225. McLoughlin, supra note 218, at 1403 (quoting Isaac Backus, A Declaration of the Rights of the
Inhabitants of the State of Massachusetts-Bay).
226. John Leland acknowledged that, “[s]hould a man . . . [in] any wise disturb the peace and good
order of the civil police, he should be punished according to his crime, let his religion be what it will;
but where a man is a peaceable subject of state, he should be protected in worshipping the Deity
according to the dictates of his own conscience.” McConnell, Freedom from Persecution, supra note
110, at 825 (quoting John Leland, The Yankee Spy, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN
LELAND 213, 228 (L.F. Greene ed., New York, G.W. Wood 1845)). Lest there be any doubt about the
scope of civil authority, Leland also asserted that the “legitimate powers of government extend only to
punish men for working ill to their neighbors.” McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 104,
at 1145 (quoting THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 118). In Israel Evans’ words,
“[w]hen a man adopts such notions as, in their practice, counteract the peace and good order of society,
he then perverts and abuses the original liberty of man,” and therefore, it is both right and proper that he
be prevented from “disturbing the peace of the community, and injuring his fellow-citizens.” Israel
Evans, supra note 221, at 1062-63.
227. McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1448, n.267 (quoting Letter from James Madison to
Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 98, 100 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
228. Hall, supra note 206, at 458.
229. Id.
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Backus and others who would participate in the formative constitutional debates
regarding religious liberty. 230 Backus was “one of the most influential advocates of
religious freedom at the founding.” 231 Backus actively began opposing the stateestablished church in Massachusetts in 1748 and continued thereafter, advocating for
a broad conception of religious liberty at the Massachusetts constitutional
convention.232 Their view of religious liberty found fertile ground in Maine, where
Baptists formed “the largest religious denomination” around the time Maine
achieved independence in 1820.233
Given the influential nature of the proponents of the theological view in New
England generally, and Maine in particular, it is not surprising that Section 3 of the
Declaration of Rights reflects the primary tenets of their view. Section 3 expressly
affirms that religious liberty is an “unalienable right.”234 It declares that every man
is free to worship God “in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of
that person’s own conscience,”235 thereby recognizing that matters of religion are
outside the scope of civil cognizance and are left to individual conviction. And,
finally, it frames the limitations on religious liberty in terms of protecting “the public
peace” and the “religious worship” of others,236 thereby establishing that religion
cannot be used to disturb the peace or the individual rights of others. The parallels
between the theological view and Section 3 are patent.
2. The Framers’ View of Religious Liberty
The confluence of the theological view and Section 3 of the Declaration of
Rights is no mere accident; rather, it reflects a reasoned choice. The framers of the
Maine Constitution debated at length the proper relationship between government
and religion, and their conclusion was consistent with the theological view advanced
by Williams, Backus, and Madison. Perhaps not coincidentally, dissenting
clergymen were well represented at the convention—including eight Baptist
ministers.237 Their presence may well account for the constitutional convention’s
230. Eberle, supra note 214, at 464, 466, 470-71.
231. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 17
(2000).
232. See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 165, at 1592.
233. WILLIAM D. WILLIAMSON, 2 THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF MAINE 696 (1832).
234. ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. BANKS, supra note 2, at 151. Of the delegates, the majority were likely farmers and
participated little in the constitutional debates. Id. Of the remainder, the largest group (around fortyfive) were businessmen. Id. At least thirty-seven were lawyers. Id. There were at least thirteen
ministers, all but one of whom were dissenters from Massachusetts’ Puritan orthodoxy. Id. Among the
delegates who debated the scope of religious freedom under the Maine Constitution, there were many
distinguished figures. Three of the most prominent speakers during this debate had remarkable careers.
Judge Thacher was a former U.S. Congressman from Massachusetts and associate justice on the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. He would serve on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upon
Maine’s admission to statehood. See Thacher, George, Biographical Dictionary of the United States
Congress, available at https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=T000141
[https://perma.cc/P5LC-8NUV]. Judge Parris was a former U.S. Congressman from Massachusetts, as
well as judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. He was later elected Governor of
Maine and United States Senator from Maine and would also serve on the Maine Supreme Judicial

36

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

solicitude toward free exercise of religion, including “why the convention adopted
no religious tests of any kind in the Constitution.” 238 Notably, “[i]n the debate over
what became Section 3 of Article I, no one contested the establishment of the
principle of freedom of religion.”239 Further, as will be seen, none of the delegates
echoed Thomas Jefferson’s Enlightenment view of religious liberty, with its
“profound skepticism of organized religion.”240
Instead, the debate reflected the influence of not only the theological view of
religious liberty but also the “civic republican view” and the “Puritan view” —both
of which had a strong influence in New England generally and Massachusetts in
particular.241 Civic republicans “shared much common ground” with the theological
view, but they “sought to imbue the public square with a common religious ethic and
ethos.”242 The Puritan view, meanwhile, “readily countenanced the coordination and
cooperation of church and state,” including material aid to churches, while “leaving
little room for individual religious experimentation.”243
Massachusetts’s
constitution reflected (at least in part) the civic republican and Puritan views,
proclaiming that “[i]t is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly
and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and
preserver of the universe.”244 Massachusetts also allowed for taxation for the support
of public worship.245 In practice, moreover, Massachusetts long suppressed religious
dissent.246
The debate over whether the Maine Constitution should reflect such views of
religious liberty, or instead the more voluntarist approach of the theological view,
“occupied most of the debate on Article I at the 1819 Convention.”247 Ultimately,

Court. See Parris, Albion, id., available at https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails
?memIndex=P000079 [https://perma.cc/LX7E-SUNQ]. Mr. Holmes, the most notable speaker and a
vigorous advocate for a broad conception of religious liberty, was a former U.S. Congressman from
Massachusetts, and would become a United States Senator for the State of Maine upon Maine’s
admission to the Union. See Holmes, John, id., available at https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home
/MemberDetails?memIndex=H000739 [https://perma.cc/ZS2B-4F7L].
238. BANKS, supra note 2, at 151. A religious test requirement was proposed but defeated.
DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 293-94.
239. BANKS, supra note 2, at 151.
240. Witte, supra note 85, at 384.
241. Id. at 378-79 (describing Puritan influence in New England); id. at 385, 387 (noting that John
Adams, author of the Massachusetts Constitution, was a “principal spokesman” of the civic republican
view and noting that “[p]ost-revolutionary Massachusetts proved to be fertile ground for the cultivation
of . . . civic republican views”).
242. Id. at 381.
243. Id. at 378-80.
244. MASS CONST. part I, art. II.
245. Witte, supra note 85, at 379-80; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 165, at 1563; Laura
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to
First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 883 (1995). This practice imposed significant
hardship on dissenters. BANKS, supra note 2, at 154-55.
246. Witte, supra note 85, at 380 (noting that, even in the eighteenth century, dissidents “enjoyed
only limited political rights”). The Baptists, for instance, “were severely persecuted in Massachusetts,
for mere opposition to infant baptism.” WILLIAMSON, supra note 231, at 696. Ultimately, the Puritan
view did soften into a more voluntarist view. See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 200, at 25.
247. Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 64 n.17.
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the delegates opted “in favor of genuine religious freedom.” 248 As Professor Esbeck
has observed,
Maine [at the time of its founding] was . . . a land of diverse religious influences
populated by rugged individualists . . . . Competing religions and convictions
concerning voluntaryism, as well as the independent spirit of the settlers, found their
voice in Maine’s 1819 constitution. . . . The constitution did not establish any
religion while ensuring religious liberty for the state’s diverse population.249

This new course is evidenced by the framers’ debate over the wording of Section 3
as well as the framers’ debate over religious exemptions from militia duty.
a. Religious Liberty as an Unalienable Right
As will be seen, the framers spent much time debating the language to be used
in Section 3. A large portion of that debate focused on whether the Maine
Constitution ought to include a preamble, similar to that used in the Massachusetts
Constitution, acknowledging man’s duties toward God. The framers ultimately
chose to exclude such language—not because they believed religion to be anathema,
but because they concluded that religion is a voluntary matter of conscience beyond
the jurisdiction of civil government.
The debate over Section 3 began with a poignant moment. A group representing
the “Catholics of Maine” presented a petition to the convention stating that “under
the Constitution of Massachusetts they were excluded from an equal participation of
the benefits of government, and praying that by the new constitution, they might be
admitted to an equality of religious and civil rights and immunities.” 250 Judge Parris
observed that “the object of the memorialists” would “doubtless be secured to them
by the Bill of Rights, if adopted as reported.”251 He then moved that the petition lie
on the table, and it was so ordered.252 It was with this clear indication of the drafting
committee’s intent to enshrine a robust protection of religious liberty that the
delegates took up consideration of Section 3. After long debate, the convention
placed religious practices largely beyond the purview of government, as the
petitioners had hoped.253
Following presentation of the petition, Judge Thacher moved to amend the text
of Section 3 to include language declaring as follows: “As it is the absolute duty of
all men to worship God their creator, so it is their natural right to worship him in
such way and manner as their conscience dictates, to be agreeable to his revealed

248. Id.; see BANKS, supra note 2, at 154-55.
249. Esbeck, supra note 217, at 1538-39.
250. DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 92. This was not the first time that Maine residents
raised objections to Massachusetts’ restrictions on religious liberty. In 1680, over a hundred
individuals, including Baptist dissenters, in what would become southern Maine petitioned “for direct
royal control of Maine on the ground that Massachusetts was suppressing religious freedom.” Charles
E. Clarke, THE EASTERN FRONTIER: THE SETTLEMENT OF NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND 1610-1763, at 80
(1970); see BANKS, supra note 2, at 10-11.
251. DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 93. Judge Parris’s observation stands in stark contrast
to the Law Court’s ruling in Donahue.
252. Id. at 93-94.
253. See generally HATCH, supra note 2, at 152-54.

38

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

will.”254 He expressly declared it his purpose to place in the Declaration of Rights a
recognition of the obligation to worship God.255 Dr. Rose immediately objected that
the delegates had come “to establish a declaration of rights and not a prescription of
duties.”256 Mr. Herrick, following Dr. Rose, raised no objection to declaring the duty
of man to worship God, but suggested that it be made clear that the legislature could
not enforce performance of that duty. “Religion is in its nature personal, it is a quality
of the heart,” he argued, “and not subject to human laws, which by their severe
penalties commonly make hypocrites and bigots.”257 Mr. Holmes then rose to speak
on behalf of the drafting committee. 258 In his view, “[t]o make it a duty to exercise
a right [was] preposterous.”259 “Worship,” he contended, “is the voluntary offering
of the fruit of the heart to a Deity.” 260 He ended with a stirring peroration, speaking
of the drafting committee’s prior deliberations:
We concluded, at length, to declare the people’s rights of conscience, without
attempting to define their religious duties . . . . To prescribe the duty would be to
authorize the Legislature to enforce it. This would excite jealousy and alarm. The
worship of God is, and ought to be free. Religious oppression brought our fathers
to this country, and their descendants will not fail to resist it.261

Judge Thacher’s motion “was lost by a great majority.” 262
Another motion along the same lines was made by Mr. Emery, who sought to
amend Section 3 to read that “all men have a natural and unalienable right to exercise
the duty of worshipping Almighty God.”263 The debate again focused on whether
the state government ought to be able to declare man’s obligation to worship God.
Mr. Holmes again took the position that the government has no authority to prescribe
a manner of worship: “If you mean the duty is to be performed in a particular way,
then you prescribe the mode of performance, which we have no right to do.” 264 Judge
Green, in support of the motion, argued that it was the “duty” of government “to
encourage” religion because it was “the best security of man.” 265 Mr. Locke, a
Baptist minister, responded with an appeal to voluntarism as stirring as that raised
by Mr. Holmes in response to Judge Thacher’s motion:
We ought not to be obliged to perform the duty of worshipping God by legislative
power. The Legislature is departing from its proper sphere, when it undertakes to
regulate the intercourse between man and his Maker. Religion being seated in heart,
cannot in its own nature be cognizable by human laws. And if we appeal to history,

254. DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 94.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 95.
257. Id. at 96.
258. Holmes, who was chairman of the drafting committee, is credited with having “exercised the
most influence in shaping the document that emerged from his committee.” TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 5; see BANKS, supra note 2, at 152.
259. DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 96.
260. Id. at 97.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 98-99.
264. Id. at 99.
265. Id. at 101.
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we shall find little encouragement for legislating on this subject. Pure religion
always flourishes most, when it is left most free.266

Judge Thacher protested that the amendment would not prescribe how to exercise
the duty of worshiping God, but would instead “protect each worshipper to discharge
the duty according to the dictates of his conscience.” 267 Mr. Holmes responded that
the constitution should not “prescribe duties” in regard to religion, and that religion
stood best when undisturbed by government: “I do not believe religion is in danger
from liberality. I trust it has better props, than any this Convention can establish.
The people . . . sent us here to guard their civil rights, but not to instruct them in the
precepts of religion.”268 Mr. Emery’s motion was also “lost by a large majority.” 269
The convention confronted a similar issue when Mr. Whitman introduced a
motion to permit the Legislature to “encourage and support the institutions of public
worship.”270 Whitman argued that religion “constitutes the basis of social order,”
and that the government therefore has an interest in “promoting good morals.” 271 Mr.
Holmes again responded: “Sir, I will never consent, on any consideration, to put any
restraints upon conscience . . . . I tremble when I think of the fatal effects, which
have resulted from the interference of the civil authority in matters of religion.” 272
And such a constraint and interference he viewed Whitman’s motion to be: “Give
your Legislature a power to uphold religion, and trust to their discretion for the
suitable means, and you arm them with a weapon which might prostrate in the dust,
your religious liberties.”273 Judge Thacher supported the amendment as a “salutary
provision to preserve our existing wholesome institutions.” 274 Judge Parris
supported Holmes: “As far as I can go with the gentleman [Mr. Whitman] to support
the cause of religious principles, and leave the conscience free, so far I am with him.
But I see the dangerous tendencies of the exercise of this power; and cannot consent
to give it to them.”275 After further debate, Mr. Whitman’s amendment was “decided
in the negative.”276
This debate over the wording of Section 3 is notable on at least two levels, and
it confirms that the framers meant to leave the exercise of religion as free as possible
from government interference. First, the entire debate is suffused with a solicitude
toward religion. The framers argued not over whether to protect religious liberty,
but how best to do so. No delegates suggested that religious liberty ought to merely
be tolerated, or that religious beliefs should be granted more protection than religious
conduct. Instead, they presented two conflicting approaches to promoting religious
liberty that were both solicitous toward religion. Second, the debate is notable
because the two competing approaches to religious liberty advanced by the

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.; see id., Biographical Sketches at 94.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 105-06; see id. at 111.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 108-09.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 114.
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delegates—civic republicanism and the theological view—was clearly resolved in
favor of the voluntarist theological view, with its broad conception of religious
liberty. The “great majority” of the constitutional convention affirmed a key tenet
of that approach to religious liberty: religion is a voluntary matter of the conscience,
beyond the reach of civil authority. It is entirely unsurprising, therefore, that Section
3 comports with the theological view and frames the right to free exercise as an
unalienable right that mandates accommodation of religion.
b. Anticipating Accommodations of Religion
The debate at the 1819 constitutional convention also indicates the framers’
sensitivity toward the need for accommodations of religion even in the face of the
most compelling of state interests: national defense. The draft constitution initially
presented to the convention permitted exemption of Quakers and Shakers from
military duty.277 This provision led to substantial debate focusing on the necessity
of, and the difficulties with, exemptions from militia duty.278 The compromise
eventually struck allowed limited exemptions, not because of insensitivity toward
claims of conscience, but because of the importance of national defense.
Mr. Hall moved to amend the provision establishing the composition of the
militia, namely, Article VII, Section 5, in a manner that would not have provided for
exemptions.279 Mr. Redington objected because the amendment would draw into
service members of “religious denominations, whose consciences forbid their doing
military duty,” either by direct service or by paying an equivalent that may be equally
unconscionable to such believers.280 Mr. Holmes likewise expressed concern that it
would “interfere with the right of conscience, to compel these people to contribute
to purposes of war,” yet he also acknowledged that “a state of things may exist, when
it shall be necessary that they should contribute something for military purposes.” 281
Judge Thacher then posed a challenging question: “[W]ho was to determine what a
man’s conscientious scruples were; and when they were sincere?”282 He raised
concerns with leaving it “to the consciences of individuals . . . to say whether they
will obey a general law or not, and so, on that ground, claim an exemption from a
general duty.”283 He was particularly concerned that, “in times of a national war, or
when taxes bear heavily on the community,” it was likely that “hypocritical” claims
277. Id. at 252.
278. HATCH, supra note 2, at 158.
279. DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 252.
280. Id. at 253-54.
281. Id. at 255.
282. Id. at 257. For a general discussion of Judge Thacher’s arguments, see Campbell, supra note
163, at 988-89.
283. DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 257-58. In Judge Thacher’s view, the Legislature
would never “knowingly pass a general law, directly contrary to the laws of their religion . . . contained
in the Bible.” Id. at 259. Because he believed that the Legislature would always act in accord with
scripture, he contended that any claim for exemption from such laws would likely reflect “erroneous
principles of religion.” Id. at 259-60. It was for this reason that Judge Thacher believed that, as a
general matter, “convictions of conscience . . . are no legitimate grounds for personal exemptions.” Id.
at 259. His view of the scriptural validity of claims of conscience was extraordinarily paternalistic
toward religious believers, and the record does not show that it was ever endorsed by other delegates at
the convention.
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of conscience would proliferate.284 But even he did not oppose the granting of all
exemptions from militia duty; rather, Judge Thacher contended that exemptions
could be granted if based on clear religious principles and if the legitimacy of the
claim could be verified. On the first point, he acknowledged that “any law of man
. . . contrary to, or forbidden by the laws of Christ’s kingdom, are null and void;”
but, he said, those religious dictates “ought to be clear and express” if they are to be
“paramount to all human laws.”285 On the second point, he proposed that exemptions
could be extended on the basis of denomination; that is, Quakers could be exempted
because it could readily be determined that they actually had a conscientious
objection to war.286 Thus, despite generally rejecting the voluntarist view of Mr.
Holmes and other delegates, even Judge Thacher acknowledged that exemptions
from militia duty should be recognized if adequately supported. The convention
ultimately rejected Mr. Hall’s motion, with its no-exemptions language.287
Colonel Atherton then introduced another motion that would have eliminated
exemptions based on religious conscience. 288 He acknowledged the “strong claims
for exemption” by Quakers, but argued that, if the convention “exempt[ed] all those
conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, what will become of our defence?”289
In his view, “self defence” outweighed all claims of exemption. 290 Atherton’s
motion, like Hall’s, was defeated.291
Further motions were made, and further debate was held, after Colonel
Atherton’s motion was rejected. Mr. Francis made a motion that all persons “whose
religious sentiments forbid their engaging in war” may be exempted from military
service without having to pay an equivalent. 292 Mr. Holmes again noted the
importance of claims of conscience by the Quakers, but also argued that, “in the
extremest cases, when the ultimate safety of the State is in danger,” their claims of
conscience might be outweighed and the state permitted to require payment of an
equivalent.293 Mr. Francis’s motion lost.294 Several delegates then spoke in favor of
allowing the Legislature to make exemptions. 295 General Chandler acknowledged
the need for exemptions for those with “conscientious scruples,” but also spoke in
284. Id. at 269; see id. at 258.
285. Id. at 261. Judge Thacher believed that there was no fair basis in the Christian faith to object to
paying an equivalent to serve on one’s behalf in the militia and expounded on that point at some length.
Id. at 259, 262-67. In an example of his paternalistic views toward religion, he concluded that anyone
seeking an exemption from paying an equivalent were “very much confused” in their religious beliefs.
Id. at 267.
286. Id. at 267-69.
287. Id. at 270.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 272.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 273.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 275.
294. Id. A similar motion was made later by Mr. Stockbridge, who protested that “[t]here are many
in this Convention, who cannot vote for the constitution, unless this provision is made.” Id. at 355. His
motion also lost. Id.
295. Id. at 276 (Mr. Preble: arguing that it should be left “in the power of the Legislature to exempt
those who were conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms”); id. at 277 (Colonel Moody: “It was
enough to say the Legislature may make exemptions”).
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favor of requiring an equivalent in order to maintain “the militia for the defence of
the State.”296 Colonel Atherton spoke again against allowing the Legislature to
permit conscientious or other objections without payment of an equivalent, pointing
to past difficulties in raising and funding a militia. 297
Ultimately, the convention adopted a provision that struck a compromise among
these competing concerns.298 As adopted, Section 5 of Article VII permitted
exemptions of “Quakers and Shakers” as well as “Ministers of the Gospel” from
military duty.299 Quakers, Shakers, and clergymen were recognized to have such an
unquestioned claim of religious conscience that they could be exempted even from
the requirement to pay an equivalent; others could be exempted, but—given the
strength of the state’s interests—would be required to pay an equivalent. 300
Accordingly, the framers recognized the necessity of religious exemptions, even in
the context of military service.
The debate over military exemptions was not definitive, but it was resolved in a
manner consistent with the theological view of free exercise. 301 It indicates that the
framers accepted the concept that individual claims of conscience may require
exemptions from generally applicable laws because of the superior claim of religious
conscience. It also indicates, however, that the framers recognized the necessity of
ensuring the common defense as central to the role of civil government. In the
context of military duty—which implicates the most compelling of state interests—
the framers ultimately chose not to constitutionally mandate accommodation of
religion. They did, however, specifically provide that the Legislature was free to
allow such exemptions.302 This approach was almost precisely the approach

296. Id. at 277.
297. Id. at 348-51.
298. See generally HATCH, supra note 2, at 158.
299. ME. CONST. OF 1820, art. VII, § 5. The delegates expressly chose not to limit the exemption for
“Ministers of the Gospel” to those who were “ordained and settled.” DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra
note 1, at 355-58. Judge Thacher and Colonel Moody supported including this limitation, because it
would otherwise “be difficult to decide who were ministers of the gospel.” Id. Mr. Holmes spoke
against the limitation, because “[t]here are many candidates and missionaries . . . who we do not want in
the ranks of the militia.” Id. at 355. Mr. Locke also spoke against the limitation, as the “ordained and
settled” language might prevent missionaries from being exempted from military service. Id. at 356.
Judge Dana lent his support to Mr. Holmes and Mr. Locke, arguing that toleration—not coercion—
should be the guiding principle, and that denominations might arise “who shall have able and pious
teachers, who ought . . . to be exempted from military duty, and yet do not come within this
description.” Id. at 357. “[H]ow unwise and how unjust,” he argued, “it would be to select those
teachers of religion, and those only, who belong to particular denominations, as candidates for favour, to
the exclusion of all others; it would be an invidious distinction, and such an one as I hope and trust we
shall not adopt.” Id. The proposed limitation was stricken. Id. at 358.
300. ME. CONST. OF 1820, art. VII, § 5.
301. The debate does not indicate that Article I, Section 3 fails to mandate exemptions for religious
practices. Although one could argue that no exemption would have been necessary in the militia clause
if Section 3 requires accommodation of religion, this argument falls short. Constitutionally mandated
exemptions for religious believers might not apply to military service because of the compelling state
interest in providing for the public defense.
302. ME. CONST. OF 1820, art. VII, § 5.
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advocated by Roger Williams.303 Accordingly, the debate indicates that the framers
appreciated the difficult balancing required in accommodating religion and valued
religious conscience even when it conflicted with a basic obligation of civil
government—protection of the state. Ultimately, they resolved the issue of
exemptions from militia duty in a manner consistent with the theological view of
religious liberty.304
CONCLUSION
The Law Court has established that the Maine Constitution still has independent
vitality and must be accorded its proper place as a guarantor of the civil rights of
Maine citizens. The primacy approach to constitutional interpretation is sound, and
the Law Court should renew its commitment to that jurisprudential approach, thereby
giving the Declaration of Rights the attention that it is due. Only by doing so can the
liberties guaranteed therein—including the “unalienable right” of religious liberty—
be adequately protected.
The free exercise clause illustrates the importance of the primacy approach. As
the Law Court has recognized, Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights guarantees that
religious believers will be protected in their beliefs and conduct absent a compelling
state interest. The text of Section 3 mandates that the conscience of religious
believers be accommodated as long as they do not violate the public peace or deprive
others of religious liberty. This mandate reflects more than the non-discrimination
principle of Smith. Instead, it reflects the framers’ commitment to vibrant conception
of religious liberty for all—including minorities who, like the Catholics of their day,
suffer oppression through the application of “neutral” laws.
The Maine Constitution, even 200 years after its adoption, still matters—for
civil liberties generally and free exercise of religion specifically. To borrow the
words of John Holmes, the Declaration of Rights ensures that the people of Maine
remain as they “ought to be”: free.

303. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 165, at 1630 (noting that Williams asserted that “Quakers and
Baptists . . . could not claim a right, divine or otherwise, to exemption from militia service” but allowed
that it might be appropriate for “government to accommodate conscientious objectors”).
304. See generally id. at 1634-35.
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